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Bank Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks 
 
Abstract 
Asset securitizations increase audit complexity and audit risks, which are expected to 
increase audit fees. Using US bank holding company data from 2003 to 2011, we find 
significant and positive associations between asset securitization risks and audit fees. After 
the commencement of the global financial crisis (GFC), there was an increased focus on the 
role of audits on asset securitization risks resulting from the crisis in the banking industry. 
Therefore, we expect that auditors would become more sensitive to banks’ asset securitization 
risks after the commencement of the global financial crisis. We find that auditors appear to 
focus on different aspects of asset securitization risks after the onset of the crisis and that 
auditors appear to charge a GFC premium for banks. 
 
Keywords: Audit fees; Asset securitization; Bank holding companies; Financial crisis 
Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper. 




Bank Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Auditors have been criticized in relation to their role in auditing asset securitizations in the 
form of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. During the emergence 
of the sub-prime mortgage problem through 2003–2005 and its eruption with the downturn in 
the US real estate market in 2006, substantial attention was given to accounting issues and 
valuation concerns with securitized assets (e.g., Karaoglu 2005; Niu and Richardson 2006; 
Shipper and Yohn 2007). This is exemplified by the public and political attention given to 
Fannie Mae in 2004 and related prosecutions in 2006. However, there was little such attention 
given to more generalized auditing risks pertaining to loan securitization at that time.  
Criticisms of auditors intensified with the 2007 surge in problems faced by firms dealing in 
securitized loans, exacerbated by the subsequent failures of banks and other mortgage lenders 
(e.g., Richard 2008). It is now perceived that audit failures in relation to securitized assets 
pre-date the global financial crisis. The initial bank failures associated with the onset of the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007 and subsequent high profile cases of failure or distress 
have generated accusations that auditors did not take appropriate actions in response to asset 
securitization risks. In response to fraudulent misstatements regarding recourse or repurchase 
provisions, it was alleged that auditors helped or allowed companies to violate GAAP (e.g., 
New Century case1; see Kardos 2009). Moreover, auditors issued inappropriate opinions on 
banks with significant securitizations and overall insolvency issues (e.g., Lehman Brothers 
                                                 
1 Accusations against New Century’s auditor, KPMG, of failing to take appropriate action and aiding in 
breaches of GAAP are contained in the Complaint for Declaratory Relief; Negligence and Aiding and 
Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty to the Superior Court of The State of California filed by Thomas, 
Alexander & Forrester LLP (attorneys for The New Century Liquidating Trust) in March 2009. 
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case 2007; see Richard 2008) and used inadequate audit processes (e.g., Fannie Mae scandal 
2006). The 2011 House of Lords report on the UK audit market concludes that, although 
audit professionals deny audit failures in the banking industry surrounding the onset of the 
GFC, “the complacency of bank auditors was a significant contributory factor. Either they 
were culpably unaware of the mounting dangers, or, if they were aware of them, they equally 
culpably failed to alert the supervisory authority of their concerns.” (p.46, House of Lords 
2011). 
The banking industry plays a critical role in the economy. As a result of its importance to the 
economy, there is a high level of public interest in the banking industry and the reliability of 
banks’ audited financial reports. A considerable amount of public attention has been focused 
on the role of auditors in identifying asset securitization risks and their potential consequence 
during bank audits. Commensurate with this increased focus on bank audits, auditors’ 
reputation and brand name have been subject to enhanced scrutiny, particularly for bank 
audits. In addition to regular external audits, banks are audited and supervised by the Federal 
Reserve, FDIC and other bank regulators. The strict regulatory requirements for the banking 
industry can decrease reporting irregularities, which increases reporting quality. One example 
of such a regulatory requirements that the FDICIA implemented in 1993 is the requirement 
for insured depository institutions with $500 million or more in total assets to prepare 
management reports on the effectiveness of internal control systems, compliance and 
procedures for financial reporting that these reports must have an assurance report provided 
by independent auditors. Studies find that the FDICIA has strengthened the economic 
viability of banks (Carnell 1997) leading banks to become more risk averse and less prone to 
failures (Benston and Kaufman 1998).  
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Prior audit fee studies find that audit fees are positively associated with financial risks. This is 
because higher levels of financial risk lead to higher levels of audit risk associated with going 
concern problems and management’s motives and opportunities to discretionarily manipulate 
financial reporting. However, most prior studies consider the impact of on-balance sheet 
financial risk factors on audit fees. There has been little investigation of the impact of 
off-balance sheet financial risks on audit effort and audit fees. Compared with on-balance 
sheet financial risks, off-balance sheet financial risks are more difficult to identify, and 
off-balance sheet transactions are often more complex than on-balance sheet transactions and 
therefore harder to audit. Therefore, the study of off-balance sheet risks on audit effort and 
audit fees is an important area to study. The off-balance sheet financial risks we address in 
this study are the risks associated with asset securitizations. The criticisms of auditors’ role in 
asset securitizations implies that auditors are suspected not focusing on these type of risks 
and therefore may not have priced them in audit fees. Prior studies investigate the economic 
substance of asset securitization risk transfers (Kane 1997; Niu and Richardson 2006; Shipper 
and Yohn 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2012), the extent of risk 
transfers with recourse (Higgins and Mason 2004; Gorton and Souleles 2006; Chen et al. 
2008), information uncertainty regarding risk transfer (Cheng et al. 2011), and earnings and 
capital management in asset securitizations (Ambrose et al. 2005; Karaoglu 2005; Rosenblatt 
et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009; Dechow et al. 2010). The evidence of asset 
securitization risks in these studies and the public criticisms of auditors in relation to bank 
losses associated with asset securitizations since 2007 suggest that auditors should be attuned 
to these risks. If auditors respond to differences in asset securitization risks by adjusting their 
audit effort or risk premiums, then we should observe positive relations between asset 
securitization risks and audit fees. However, there is little or no research examining the link 
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between asset securitization risks to originating banks and their audit fees. We address this 
significant gap in our knowledge of audits by investigating whether there is a significant 
association between audit fees and asset securitization risks for listed US banks.  
The outcome of this investigation is not obvious and the relation may have changed over 
time. Prior research suggests that bank audit fees are sensitive to the bank’s business failure 
risk during the savings and loan crisis (Hill et al. 1994). The 2007 global financial crisis 
resulted in pervasive distress and failure in the banking industry, which may trigger auditors’ 
sensitivity to business failure risks and be reflected in an increased audit fee. In addition, we 
argue that the variable nature of asset securitizations and flexible accounting rules were 
particularly challenging for auditors during the onset of the financial crisis. The complexity 
of asset securitizations and management’s flexibility to choose whether to account for asset 
securitizations as asset sales or borrowings (Kane 1997; Shipper and Yohn 2007) may make it 
difficult for auditors to identify the true economic substance of the instruments, the financial 
risk status of the originating bank, and the discretionary earnings and capital management 
opportunities created by securitization transactions (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Matsumoto 
2002; Karaoglu 2005). These challenges and auditors’ limitations also affect auditors’ 
business risk and inherent risk considerations in audit planning and pricing (Houston et al. 
1999; Phillips 1999; Beaulieu 2001). If auditors focus on maintaining audit quality, higher 
securitization risk should induce increased audit effort, resulting in higher audit fees.2 
The issuance of FAS 166 and FAS 167 in 2009 largely limited the scope of sales accounting 
and non-consolidation of asset securitizations. Correspondingly, management’s opportunities 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, self-interested auditors who recognize their risk exposure but are constrained from increasing 
effort may price-protect themselves by charging an audit fee premium, which also results in higher audit 
fees. The available data do not allow us to test these competing sources of differences in audit fees. 
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for using asset securitization transactions for manipulation purposes have also been greatly 
eliminated. Under FAS 166 and FAS 167, although securitization risks are still a noticeable 
audit risk source, the risk should have been restricted to its complexity, resulting in a 
changing audit pricing pattern with regard to asset securitization transactions. 
The expected relation between securitization risks and audit fees allows us to use the 
established audit fee modeling methods to investigate whether auditors respond to differences 
in risks arising from asset securitizations, and whether auditor behavior changed as a result of 
the global financial crisis.3 To do so, we extend the bank audit fee model in Fields et al. 
(2004) to include asset securitization risk measures. Consistent with Cheng et al. (2011), we 
measure asset securitization risks using principal component factors generated from the ratios 
of securitized assets to total assets, retained interests to total assets, gains from securitizations 
to net income, non-performing securitized loans to total assets, and the charge-offs for 
securitized loans to total assets. We identify two significant factors: one relates to balance 
sheet aspects of asset securitization risks, and the other relates to income statement aspects of 
asset securitization risks. 
Using publicly available US bank holding company (BHC) data from 2003 to 2011, we find 
significant and positive associations between asset securitization risks and audit fees.4 It is 
reasonable to expect that auditors would become more sensitive to banks’ asset securitization 
risks following criticisms of their role in bank failures and the financial downturn that 
                                                 
3 Extant studies extensively investigate cross-sectional determination and inter-temporal variation in audit fees 
for indications of variation in audit effort and fee premia (Simunic 1980, 1984; Palmrose 1986; Ettredge and 
Greenberg 1990; Pratt and Stice 1994; Craswell et al. 1995). However, most audit fee studies specifically 
exclude financial institutions from their analyses because of the attendant accounting and risk differences 
compared to other sectors. As a result, there is relatively little research on audit effort and pricing in the 
banking industry. 
4 Our sample period finishes at the end of 2011. After 2009, accounting regulations changed significantly with 
the issuance of FAS 166 and FAS 167. 
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commenced in 2007. Consistent with this proposition, we find that audit fees reflect 
securitization risks both before and after the onset of the GFC, but the relations change with 
the start of the GFC. Pre-GFC, both the composite balance sheet and income statement 
measures of asset securitization risk are significantly associated with audit fees. However, 
during the GFC, the effect of the composite measure of the balance sheet aspect of asset 
securitization risk is only marginally significant and the effect of the income aspect of asset 
securitization risk, while significant, decreased in its magnitude. In additional tests, we 
replace the composite measures of securitization risk with the individual asset securitization 
risk factors. Pre-GFC, there is a significant association between each of the four asset 
securitization measures and audit fees. However, during the GFC, only retained interests and 
securitization income are significantly associated with audit fees. With the implementation of 
FAS 166 and FAS 167, audit risks embedded in asset securitization transactions were 
significantly reduced. Correspondingly, both the composite balance sheet and income 
statement measures of asset securitization risk are not significant in audit pricing for the 
2010-2011 period; and the individual asset securitization risk factor test suggests retained 
interests and underlying credit quality are still important for bank auditors. Overall, our 
results suggest that auditors actively changed their audit risk considerations on asset 
securitization transactions as a result of the changing economic and regulatory environments.  
Asset securitizations are economically significant sources of audit risk, as revealed by the 
financial crisis and bank failures. Therefore, evidence concerning whether auditors take 
account of asset securitizations risks is an important contribution to the auditing literature. 
Our evidence that auditors respond to asset securitization risks, as reflected in audit fees, both 
before and after the onset of the GFC and that their behavior changes in response to changes 
in market and regulatory conditions counters criticisms that auditors did not consider asset 
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securitization risks when conducting bank audits.  
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on bank audits, which is a growing area of 
policy interest since the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (Basel 2008) called for more 
research on bank audits in areas of particular interest to bank regulators and important to 
financial markets. Since Fields et al. (2004), several studies have examined audit pricing in 
financial institutions and find that audit fees are strongly and positively related to the risks 
and complexity of bank audits (e.g. Boo and Sharma 2008, Ettredge et al. 2011, Doogar et al. 
2012). However, none of them has focused on off-balance sheet financial risks.  
Our study also extends the literature on the effectiveness of bank audits surrounding financial 
crises. Hill et al. (1994) find evidence that audit fees are positively associated with clients’ 
failure risk and litigation involvement, which provides some evidence to counter the criticism 
of audit failures of Savings and Loan institutions during the 1983-1988 Savings and Loan 
crisis period. Our results are consistent with Hill et al. (1994) in this respect. However, 
without a pre and post comparison, Hill et al. (1994) cannot explicitly identify changes in 
auditors’ pricing behavior with the onset of the crisis in general and on specific risk factors. 
Our study addresses general audit fee changes and changes in specific fee premiums 
associated with asset securitizations because of the GFC by comparing pre-GFC and 
during-GFC periods. In addition, the asset securitization risks studied in this paper are major 
contributing factors leading to the GFC; while the business failure risks and litigation concern 
studied in Hill et al. (1994) are the business outcomes generated by the financial crisis. 
Although auditors are not required to predict business failures, market participants anticipate 
predictive information from auditors’ reports (Knechel et al. 2012). Therefore, whether 
auditors are able to identify forward-looking risk factors is critical to enhancing 
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market-expected audit quality.  
Doogar et al. (2012) find that during 2005-2007 auditors appear to shift their audit attention 
on on-balance sheet items in line with the unfolding economic shocks, suggesting that 
auditors can recognize and respond to the entity-level implications of crisis-related events. 
Although both our study and Doogar et al. (2012) treat the GFC as a study event and 
investigate financial risk factors and bank audit fees, Doogar et al (2012) focus on on-balance 
sheet loan default and retention risks, and only consider the on-balance sheet portion of 
mortgage-related asset securitization risk. In comparison, our study focuses on 
comprehensive securitization risks, including on-balance sheet retained interests, overall 
securitization transaction level (mostly off-balance sheet), underlying credit quality, and 
earnings performance, covering both mortgage-related and other asset-backed securitization 
transactions. Although the GFC started from the subprime mortgage crisis, and mortgage 
loans and associated securitizations are important in the pre-GFC and during-GFC periods, 
based on our data, mortgage related retained interests are only 19% of the total retained 
interests. Therefore, we believe other types of loans cannot be neglected in studies on asset 
securitizations and on the GFC. In addition, our study period covers the periods before the 
GFC, during the GFC and after the implementation of FAS 166 and 167; while Doogar et al. 
(2012) only examine the years leading to the GFC until 2007. Our results provide recent 
evidence consistent with the results reported in Hill et al. (1994) concerning auditors’ 
response to business risk factors during crisis periods and consistent with Doogar et al. 
(2012) that auditors actively adjust attention to risk factors with the occurrence of the GFC.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Relevant research is reviewed in Section 
II and hypotheses are developed in Section III. Section IV describes the research design and 
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Section V reports the main results. Robustness and additional tests are reported in Section VI. 
Section VII concludes the study. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Asset securitizations 
A bank’s asset securitization transaction begins with the bank selling its cash flow rights from 
a pool of financial assets, such as mortgages and loans, to a special purpose entity (SPE) that 
is usually organized as a ‘qualifying special purpose entity’ (QSPE) to avoid consolidation in 
the bank’s accounts. The SPE then securitizes the assets in ranked tranches. In the absence of 
credit enhancements, the most junior securities tranche is the first to bear any default losses 
arising from the securitized assets. When the first tranche is exhausted, the losses pass to the 
second junior tranche, and so on until all losses are absorbed. Credit enhancements can 
insulate senior securities from the default risk on the underlying financial assets. 
Enhancements are provided by the originators, or a third-party guarantor, in the form of cash 
collateral accounts, reserve funds, commitments to (re)purchase assets in default, credit 
derivatives, or recourse provisions. Rating agencies are involved in this step to assign ratings 
to the tranches. The usual securitization strategy is to maximize the size of the most senior 
tranche while still obtaining a AAA rating, and to leave the first (most junior) tranche unrated 
and as small as possible while still allowing the second tranche to obtain an investment grade 
rating (Ryan 2008). The most junior tranche(s) is often retained by the SPE and the 
investment-grade tranches are sold to investors.5 Proceeds from investors fund the SPE’s 
purchase of the cash flow rights from the bank. The SPE distributes the future cash flows 
                                                 
5 We don’t consider situations where a retained junior tranche is re-securitized to a CDO with more complex 
securitization and credit enhancement procedures and sold to investors. This “upgrading” of the junior 
tranche to an investment-grade security has a similar balance sheet effect to the simpler model. 
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generated by the underlying securitized assets to the investors, as specified in the security. 
Accounting choices 
The bank’s main accounting choice in relation to the securitization of financial assets is 
whether the initial transfer to the SPE is treated as a sale or as borrowing. For the years from 
2003 to 2009, the accounting treatment was determined under FAS 140 (2003 to 2006) and 
FAS 156 (after 2006).6 Treating the transaction as a sale allowed a bank to: (1) remove the 
securitized assets from its balance sheet; (2) record cash proceeds as the amount received and 
recognize non-cash proceeds at fair value; (3) recognize the book value of the retained 
sub-securities as the proportion of the sub-securities’ fair value to the fair value of the 
securitized assets; (4) recognize the retained interests other than sub-securities (e.g., servicing 
assets) in the same way as retained sub-securities under FAS 140 or at fair value under FAS 
156; and (5) record the difference between net cash proceeds and the value of the components 
of assets sold as a gain or loss (Cheng et al. 2011). For a securitization to qualify as an asset 
sale, the transferor must transfer the financial assets to a bankruptcy-remote entity and 
surrender control of the transferred assets. To avoid being included in the bank’s consolidated 
financial report, the entity must be a QSPE satisfying the conditions specified in FIN 46(R) or 
otherwise independent of the bank. If the asset transfer qualifies as a sale, the loans are taken 
off the balance sheet and the bank recognizes any retained interests (including servicing 
assets) on its balance sheet; unrealized future cash flows are treated as a gain or loss in the 
                                                 
6 For the years 2003 to 2009, accounting for an asset securitization was subject to FAS 140 (or FAS156 after 
2006) Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities and 
FIN 46(R) An FASB interpretation of ARB 51 relating to consolidation of SPEs. The change from FAS 140 
to FAS 156 had a very limited impact on the sale versus borrowing accounting choice. The required change 
of fair value measurement to servicing assets in FAS 156 has limited affect our study because servicing 
assets represent a small portion of retained interests and are not a focus of our study. Effective from 
November 2009, FAS 166 and FAS 167 largely limit the scope of accounting for asset securitization as sales. 
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current income statement. Compared with secured borrowing accounting, sale accounting has 
the effect of dressing up reported leverage, liquidity, earnings, and the capital ratio. Effective 
from November 2009, FAS 166 and FAS 167 amend FAS 140 and FIN 46R by: (1) removing 
the concept of a QSPE in FAS 140, and removing the consolidation exemption for QSPEs 
that was in FIN 46R; (2) introducing the “continuing involvement” approach and the 
“participating interest” criteria, shares of cash flows correspond to shares of ownership, and 
the de-recognition is denied if the transferor continues to have certain involvement with the 
transferred assets; and (3) all assets (including retained interests) and liabilities incurred in a 
securitization transaction accounted for as a sale are to be initially measured at fair value. 
Therefore, QSPE ceased to be a passport to non-consolidation in asset securitizations after 
November 2009, and asset securitization transactions will not normally be recognized as sales 
after the implementation of FAS 166. As a consequence, accounting for asset securitizations 
as sales and the non-consolidation of securitization-related SPEs have mostly been eliminated 
by FAS 166 and FAS 167.  
The economic substance of asset securitizations 
Before the reformation of securitization accounting rules that resulted in FAS 166 and FAS 
167, the general view of standard setters and regulators was to treat asset securitization as a 
sale with the appropriate transfer of risks (FAS 140; FIN 46R). Although rating agencies 
claim they treat asset securitizations as secured borrowings before and after the sub-prime 
crisis (e.g., S&P Corporate Rating Criteria 2001, 2008), empirical evidence suggests that, in 
practice, the rating agencies treat asset securitizations as sales (Cheng and Neamtiu 2009; 
Barth et al. 2012). In contrast, with respect to risk and value relevance, the capital market 
appears to endow securitizations with incomplete transfers of control and risk and treats them 
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as secured borrowings (Kane 1997; Ryan 1997; Treacy and Carey 1998; Niu and Richardson 
2006; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Hansel and Krahnen 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 
2008; Barth et al. 2012). A fundamental aspect of the extent and nature of risk transfers in 
banks’ asset securitizations is the explicit or implicit recourse that leaves the bank with 
residual risks in addition to their recognized retained interests. The existence of unrecognized 
implicit risks appears to have been a basic issue in assessing the financial exposure of banks 
that had engaged in securitizations.  
Incomplete disclosure requirements during 2003–2009 generally constrain full identification 
of recourse risks carried by the originating banks. It is generally accepted that asset 
securitizations increase information uncertainty and asymmetry (Amihud and Mendelson 
1986; Chordia et al. 2001; Easley and O’Hara 2002; Cheng et al. 2011).7 The financial 
reporting choices cannot fully describe complex asset securitization transactions (Schwarcz 
2004; Ryan 2007) and Barth et al. (2003) report that complexity and flexibility in security 
structuring and accounting treatments lead to information uncertainty and asymmetry. 
Although the implementation of FAS 166 and FAS 167 in November 2009 reduced flexibility 
in accounting for asset securitizations, information uncertainty still exists within asset 
securitization activities due to the complexity of securitization transactions, procedures and 
documentation. 
III.  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Prior research suggests that, on average, financial markets treat asset securitizations as 
                                                 
7 Before the sub-prime crisis, it was argued that securitization could reduce information uncertainty because 
compared to non-securitized assets, securitization requires disclosure of more information (Foley et al. 1999; 
Schwarcz 2004) and the increased transparency regarding underlying loans mitigated information 
asymmetry; and rating agencies periodically publish ratings on securities and provide third party monitoring 
of securitized assets. 
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borrowings with the risk retained by the originator, especially under unfavorable market 
conditions (Kane 1997; Ryan 1997; Treacy and Carey 1998; Niu and Richardson 2006; 
Shipper and Yohn 2007; Hansel and Krahnen 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2008; 
Barth et al. 2012). Arguing that auditors are sensitive to market participants’ attitudes towards 
asset securitizations, we hypothesize relations between auditor risk and asset securitization 
risk factors, and how the relations might vary with changing market conditions. 
The purpose of an audit is to reduce information risk by providing assurance that an entity’s 
financial report is free from material omissions or misstatements. Auditing standards require 
auditors to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level when planning and conducting an audit. 
An auditor who identifies higher risk of material misstatement is expected to reduce detection 
risk by allocating more audit resources (expending more effort) to the higher risk areas of the 
engagement to achieve an acceptable level of audit risk in both non-bank audits (O’Keefe et 
al. 1994; Pratt and Stice 1994; Lyon and Maher 2005; Hay et al. 2006) and bank audits 
(Fields et al. 2004). 
We expect asset securitizations to increase auditors’ assessed risks of material misstatement 
for at least three reasons. First, asset securitizations are complex transactions between 
multiple parties (such as the client bank, one or more SPEs, a guarantor, a rating agency and 
investors), which involve complex legal documents and increase inherent risk. Second, 
accounting for a securitization as a sale, and externalization of the SPE and its subsequent 
transactions, may veil the economic substance of the transaction and the financial risk status 
of the bank. Third, securitization transactions may arise from motivations associated with 
earnings management (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsumoto 2002) and 
capital management (Moyer 1990; Karaoglu 2005). Bank management may exploit the SPE 
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veil to use securitizations for manipulation purposes (Karaoglu 2005; Ambrose et al. 2005; 
Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009). Overall, the complexity of 
securitization transactions facilitated considerable accounting discretion during our study 
period, when banks had significant incentives to maintain financial performance and capital 
levels.  
These factors increase the risks of material misstatements in the financial statements of banks 
engaged in asset securitizations. Therefore, we argue that asset securitization risks will 
increase auditors’ assessments of the risks of material misstatements and that auditors will 
adjust their audit effort accordingly, thus increasing audit fees.8 On this basis, we expect to 
find a positive association between asset securitization risks and audit fees.  
H1: There is a positive association between asset securitization risks and audit fees. 
We provide more detailed reasoning for this expected relation in the following section. 
Asset securitization risks and audit fees 
Auditors are expected to encounter a bank’s asset securitization risks via accounting 
disclosures and misstatement risks associated with securitization income, the level of 
securitized assets, and retained interests. As discussed below, we expect positive associations 
between each of these sources of risks and audit fees. 
Securitization income is subject to ambiguous information on securitization gains and the 
motives and practice of managers to use securitizations for earnings and capital management 
                                                 
8 The expectation that increased inherent risk assessments increases auditor effort is consistent with the extant 
auditing literature. There is substantial evidence that complexity measures based on organizational structure, 
asset structure and industry diversity are positively associated with audit effort or fees (Hay et al. 2006).  
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purposes (Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Ryan 2007). The literature identifies four 
ways in which bank managers use securitizations for opportunistic purposes: (1) timing 
(Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009); (2) classification of sales vs. 
borrowings (Karaoglu 2005); (3) selection of loans to be securitized (Pavel and Phillis 1987; 
Ambrose et al. 2005; Minton et al. 2004); and (4) valuation of retained interests (see FAS 
157; Dechow et al. 2010). Evidence of the positive impact of the risk of earnings 
management or aggressive financial reporting on audit planning and pricing is reported in 
experimental studies (Houston et al. 1999; Phillips 1999; Beaulieu 2001) and archival 
research (Gul et al. 2003; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Lyon and Maher 2005). Given that 
prior research shows that managers use asset securitizations to manage earnings, we expect a 
positive relation between securitization income and audit fees. 
Asset securitization risks are affected by the level of a bank’s securitized assets because it 
affects its exposure to implicit recourse. Further adding to potential audit effort, with 
increased levels of securitization activities, the auditor must sample from more securitization 
transactions and faces greater risks of undisclosed credit enhancements or misclassified 
transactions. Originators sometimes provide implicit recourse to the investors (Higgins and 
Mason 2004; Calomiris and Mason 2004); for example, Higgins and Mason (2004) report 17 
recourse events involving 10 credit card banks from 1987 to 2001 and find that only 2 credit 
card securitizations that entered early amortization did not provide recourse support for the 
securitized assets. Originators also voluntarily provided credit support by repurchasing assets 
or extending credit to the SPEs during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.9 This potential 
                                                 
9 In December 2007, Citigroup brought back onto its balance sheet $49 billion of SPE assets that it had 
previously securitized. The same assets were valued at $87 billion in August 2007 and Citicorp’s total 
retained interests in all securitizations were only $25.8 billion at December 31, 2006, indicating substantial 
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exposure, combined with the extent to which the amount of securitized assets may indicate 
undisclosed credit enhancements or mis-described transactions, increases the risk of 
misstatement. Therefore, we expect a positive relation between the level of asset 
securitization activities and audit fees. 
Irrespective of the classification of an asset securitization as a sale or borrowing, we expect 
auditors to consider banks’ retained interests in securitized assets when evaluating the 
inherent risks of asset securitizations. The retained interests commonly have a subordinate 
claim to the cash flows from the securitized assets, and are designed to be sufficient to cover 
potential losses. Therefore, we expect to find a positive association between the level of 
retained interests and audit fees.10 
The relative importance of retained interests and the information quality of securitization 
income may be influenced by the quality of the underlying assets. Auditors should consider 
the credit risk of the underlying financial assets as a business risk factor. When credit losses 
exceed the bank’s retained interests, securitizers may then provide implicit recourse against 
further losses of the investors. Vermilyea et al. (2008) suggest a trade-off of the bank’s 
reputation and the cost of supporting problematic securitization transactions, but the credit 
risks embedded in asset securitizations are empirically linked with the total securitized 
                                                                                                                                                        
losses to Citicorp in this striking example of honoring an implicit guarantee (Amiram et al. 2010). 
10 Two other issues may also affect auditors’ risk assessment of the information provided by retained interests. 
First, the value of retained interests is based on the fair value estimate of the securitization components (FAS 
140; FAS 157). Because the lack of a market consensus price means the fair value estimate of the 
components relies on subjective assumptions of default rates, prepayment rates and discount rates (FAS 
157), the reliability of estimated fair value is sensitive to the economic environment and is subject to 
management manipulation (Dechow et al. 2009). Second, empirical research finds evidence on the existence 
of implicit recourse to subsidize SPE investors for any default losses related to the transferred assets 
(Higgins and Mason 2004; Calomiris and Mason 2004; Chen et al. 2008; Gorton and Souleles 2005). This 
implies that the guarantee provided by the originator extends beyond retained interests to cover the total 
credit risk of the assets underlying the securities. If this is the case, retained interests may be of no particular 
importance to auditors in judging the level of risk for the originator arising from securitized assets. 
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amount, the proportion of the retained interests, and the earnings numbers in securitizations 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999). If auditors are aware of the credit risks embedded in 
securitizations, the credit quality of the securitized assets, as reflected in the non-performing 
ratio and charge-off ratio of securitized assets, will influence audit effort and, therefore, will 
have a positive association with audit fees. 
The effect of the global financial crisis on auditor behavior 
The downturn in the US property market in 2006 further escalated the rate of mortgage 
defaults. This further spurred the burgeoning credit crisis, increasing the general level of debt 
defaults, squeezing the earnings of financial sector businesses, and reducing confidence in 
many banks. The fall in corporate earnings, the emergent fragility of sub-prime debt 
instruments and increasing liquidity issues caused a deposit exodus from affected banks that 
led to prominent bank failures. These factors, combined with the accompanying demise of 
other financial entities crucial to the shadow banking system, had substantial flow-on effects 
that rolled into the global financial crisis. Bankruptcy statistics reflect this pattern. In the 
calendar years 2003–2006, US business bankruptcy filings were relatively stable at around 
35,000 filings in each year. The number of filings decreased to 25,925 in 2007 and then 
increased substantially to 58,721 in 2009 and 56,282 in 2010.11  
Prior research has investigated bank audit pricing in a financial crisis setting. Based on a 
sample of surviving savings and loan institutions for the period 1983-1988, Hill et al. (1994) 
find that a bank’s probability of business failure, bank’s involvement in litigation, and 
ownership structure are positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors 
                                                 
11 Bankruptcy statistics were obtained from www.uscourts.gov/statistics accessed June 2, 2011. A similar 




considered business risks in audit pricing during the savings and loan crisis. However, 
compared with the regional and industry-specific impact of the savings and loan crisis, the 
impact of the recent crisis on the global and US economies is pervasive. It is likely that banks 
and their auditors are sensitive to lead indicators of bankruptcy, which we suggest would have 
alerted auditors to the increased systemic risk with the onset of the GFC. Therefore, we 
investigate whether auditors’ responses to asset securitization factors changed post 
GFC-onset.  
Constraints on the availability of capital and credit, going concern and liquidity issues, and 
the discretion and complexity in SPEs contribute to the auditor’s assessment of audit risk for 
a financial sector client. This will be exacerbated by complex financing arrangements and 
significant estimation and valuation uncertainty in a deteriorating market during the GFC 
period. Irrespective of their behavior in relation to asset securitizations pre-GFC, we expect 
that auditors paid more attention to asset securitization risks post GFC-onset, resulting in a 
stronger relation between audit fees and asset securitization risks. 
H2: The positive association between asset securitization risks and audit fees is stronger 
after the onset of the GFC compared to before the GFC. 
FAS 166 and FAS 167 virtually eliminate sale accounting and non-consolidation of 
securitized assets. However the timing and the effect of FAS 166 and FAS 167 are arguable. 
Although FAS 166 and FAS 167 were issued in June 2009 and took effect in November 2009, 
these regulatory changes were proposed in 2008 when, triggered by the GFC, the market and 
regulators observed problems in securitization accounting. Coinciding with these regulatory 
change proposals in 2008, banks may have voluntarily adjusted their accounting treatment to 
securitization transactions before the implementation of the new standards (Gurun et al. 
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2009), leading to reduced off-balance sheet financial risk from asset securitizations before 
FAS 166 and FAS167 became operational, or may have entered into restructuring 
arrangements to avoid consolidating off-balance sheet securitization vehicles under the 
proposed accounting standards (Bens and Monahan 2008), leading to a more complicated 
business scenario in audits. Due to the ambiguity on the timing and the effect of the FAS 166 
and FAS 167 in audit risk assessment, we do not propose hypotheses about FAS 166/167 
changes and leave the period after the implementation of FAS 166 and FAS 167 as a 
benchmark period in the comparison. 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data Sources 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Karaoglu 2005; Chen et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2012), we 
obtain bank financial data and asset securitization details from the FRB Y9-C Regulatory 
Filing database. Y9-C reports are filed each quarter by bank holding companies (BHCs) that 
have total assets exceeding $150 million before 2006 and BHCs with total assets exceeding 
$500 million after 2006. The limit of $150 million before 2006 and the increase in the 
reporting threshold to $500 million total assets after 2006 do not affect our results because the 
majority of banks engaging in asset securitizations exceed the $500 million asset threshold 
throughout our study period. Securitization information is disclosed in Schedule HC-S 
“Servicing, Securitization and Asset Sale Activities” of Y9-C reports, which are included in 
the reports from the second quarter of 2001 with more details of retained interests disclosed 
after 2003. Auditor details are extracted from the Audit-Analytics database. One-year 
standard deviations of daily stock returns are calculated from daily stock prices and dividend 




















Our sample is restricted to listed BHCs for three reasons. First, for firms performing 
securitization activities, BHCs represent a relatively large and economically important sample 
(Barth et al. 2012). Niu and Richardson (2006) indicate the intensity of securitization related 
transactions in the traditional financial sector is more pronounced than in other sectors. 
Dechow et al. (2010) report that BHCs are the primary securitizers of financial assets. 
Second, as per Chen et al. (2008), restricting our sample to BHCs increases our ability to 
focus on the variables of interest and improves observability of the effect of the securitization 
risks. Third, audit fee information is available only for publicly listed companies. 
Our sample covers the period from 2003 to 2011. We start with 2003 because although 
securitization data on Y-9C Bank Regulatory reports are available from the second quarter of 
2001, most data on retained interests are available only from 2003. The accounting standards 
on asset securitizations are generally consistent for the years 2003 to 2009, during which FAS 
140 (replaced by FAS 156 in 2006) 12  and FIN 46R allowed sale accounting and 
non-consolidation of asset securitization transactions. Accounting standards on asset 
securitizations changed significantly in November 2009 with the implementation of FAS 166 
and FAS 167. We use the period after the implementation of FAS 166 and FAS 167 (2010 – 
2011) as a benchmark period because most of the audit risks on asset securitizations were 
removed by FAS 166 and FAS 167. The FRB Y-9C regulatory filing database contains 50,021 
BHC-year observations for 2003-2011, of which 12,763 have valid total asset data. Using the 
CRSP-BHC link to identify the listed BHCs yields 3,249 listed BHC-year observations. 
                                                 











Commented [Y5]: “This Statement must be applied as of the 
beginning of each reporting entity’s first annual reporting period that 
begins after November 15, 2009.” (FAS 166, p. i) 
It seems that FAS 166 was effective for the fiscal year beginning 
after November 2009, or in another words, for annual reports of the 
years after 2010. 
Commented [Y6]:  
According to FAS 166, a securitization of 
financial assets is accounted for as a sale when the transferring 
company surrenders control over the assets transferred and receives 
cash and other proceeds in return. Control is considered to be 
surrendered only if all three of the following conditions are met: (1) 
the assets have been legally isolated from the issuer/transferor; (2) the 
transferee has the ability to pledge or exchange the assets; and (3) the 
issuer does not maintain effective control over the assets. If the 
securitization does not qualify as a sale, it is accounted for a secured 
borrowing, which the assets remaining on the issuer's balance sheet 
and no gain or loss being recognized. 
 
Additionally, FAS 166 (along with FAS 167) eliminates the concept 
of a Qualifying Special 
Purpose Entity (QSPE). For securitizations that qualify for sale 
accounting, the use of a QSPE ensured the securitized assets and 
associated debt stay off the issuer's books. Former QSPEs are now 
subject to consolidation like any other SPE. 
 
By tightening the sale accounting requirement and eliminating 
non-consolidation opportunities, FAS166/167 remove (1) most of the 
off-balance sheet risks related to asset securitizations, and (2) 
management’s motives and opportunities to use asset securitizations 
for manipulation purposes. Both reduce inherent risk (audit risk). 
 
The audit risk still existed in asset securitizations is COMPLEXITY. 
Securitization transactions and documents are still complex and hard 
to audit.   
 




Further matching the audit fee data from Audit-Analytics database yields our final sample of 
3,051 firm-year observations for 533 US publicly listed BHCs for 2003-2011. The sample is 
comprised of 2,027 firm-years for 379 BHCs that are securitizers and 1,024 firm-years for 
224 BHCs that are non-securitizers.13 
Audit Fee Model 
We use Model (1) to test whether securitization risks are associated with audit fees. Model (1) 
is an adaptation of the audit fee model for financial institutions in Fields et al. (2004). 
LNAF =  + 1SECINC + 2SECRISK + 3GFC + 4GFC*SECINC + 
5GFC*SECRISK + 6LNTA + 7BIGN + 8STDRET + 9LOSS + 
10CAPRATIO + 11TRANSACCT + 12SECURITIES + 13COMMLOAN + 
14MTGLOAN + 15INTANG + 16CHGOFF + 17NONPERFORM + 
18INEFFICIENCY + 19SENSITIVE + 20SAVING + 21INTDERIV + 






Our dependent variable, LNAF, is the natural log of the audit fee. To test H1, we include our 
two primary test variables, SECINC and SECRISK. SECINC is the relative gains on 
securitization, calculated as the net securitization income divided by net income. SECRISK is 
asset securitization risk, calculated as a factor score generated from a principal components 
analysis using total outstanding securitized assets, retained interests, non-performing 
securitized loans and charge-offs for securitized loans, with each scaled by total assets.14 To 
                                                 
13  Approximately 2/3 (2,027/3,051) of the BHC-year observations are classified as securitizers in this study, 
which is defined as BHC-year observations that have at least one in the five test securitization variables 
(ABS, RETINT, SECINC, NPL_SEC, and CHGOFF_SEC) different from zero. For the period 2001-2009, 
Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) report that only 185 of 2,231 BHCs as securitizers, in which a BHC is defined as 
a securitizer if the reported ABS value changes in the concurrent quarter. As securitization-related audit risk 
does not just lie in the ABS occurrence and changes, considering other aspects of securitization factors 
would be necessary in this study. Our method is also consistent with Cheng et al. (2011). 














complexity variables, including the number of subsidiaries (82 
studies), the number of foreign subsidiaries (39), the proportion of 
foreign assets (11), the number of Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes that make up the client (14), the number of business 
segments (7), the number of audit locations (7), and a subjective 
rating 
of complexity provided by the audit team (9).  
 
If choosing number of SIC code, all the BHCs in the sample fall into 
the same SIC code. It is the same if choosing the number of 
segments. 
 
Foreign operations (measured as the proportion of foreign assets or 
the number of foreign subsidiaries) may not be very suitable, as the 
banking industry tend to be multinational.—or maybe not?  
 





test H2, we add GFC and interaction terms between GFC and each of SECINC and 
SECRISK. GFC is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the during-GFC years (2007–2011) and 
0 for the Pre-GFC years (2003–2006). For the benchmark tests, we add AFTER2010 and its 
interactions with SECINC and SECRISK. AFTER2010 is the indicator for years after 2010 
(2010-2011), addressing the period in which FAS166 and FAS 167 have removed most of the 
off-balance sheet risk in relation to asset securitizations while complexity might still be a 
concern for audtiors. 
There is debate about the commencement date of the GFC. Generally the consensus is that 
the GFC began in 2007. In an examination of the impact of corporate governance on the 
performance of financial firms, Erkens et al. (2012) define the GFC as the period from 
January 2007 to September 2008. Watts and Zuo (2012) define the period from August 2007 
to August 2009 as the GFC period in examining the effect of accounting conservatism on firm 
value during the GFC. In this study, the year 2007 is used as the commencement year for the 
GFC in the main tests based on the argument that the period after 2007 is generally accepted 
as the peak of the GFC.15  
Our control variables are those used in Fields et al. (2004) plus two others. LNTA is the 
natural log of total assets. BIGN equals 1 if the incumbent auditor is a Big 4 auditor, 0 
otherwise. STDRET is the corresponding one-year standard deviation of daily stock returns. 
LOSS equals 1 if the BHC reports a loss, 0 otherwise. CAPRATIO is the risk-adjusted capital 
ratio, calculated as total bank regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. 
                                                 
15  We also consider alternative definitions of the GFC period. For example, Doogar et al. (2012) consider the 
period 2005-2007 as the years leading to the GFC, implying that 2006 has seen some impact of the GFC and 
2007 is heavily influenced by GFC shocks. In our sensitivity tests, we exclude the year 2006 and 2007 
respectively to eliminate the potential bias led by the GFC cut-off; we also switch the cut-off year to 2006. 




TRANSACCT is transaction accounts divided by total deposit (transaction accounts include 
non-interest-earning demand deposit accounts, interest-bearing checking accounts in NOW 
accounts, automatic transfers from savings accounts, and Money Market deposit accounts). 
SECURITIES equals investment security assets divided by total assets (investment security 
assets include held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities). COMMLOAN is the 
proportion of commercial loans to gross loans (commercial loans consist of commercial and 
industrial loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances issued by other banks, and 
agricultural loans). MTGLOAN equals mortgage loans/gross loans. INTANG equals 
intangible assets/total assets. CHGOFF equals net charge-offs/allowance for loan and lease 
losses. NONPERFORM equals non-performing loans/gross loans (non-performing loans are 
defined as loans ≥ 90 days past due, non-accrual loans, leases and other assets). 
INEFFICIENCY is the management efficiency ratio, calculated as the ratio of total operating 
expenses (including interest expense) to total revenue (including interest revenues). 
SENSITIVE is the on-balance-sheet interest rate risk measure, calculated as (interest 
rate-sensitive assets - interest rate-sensitive liabilities)/total assets. SAVING equals 1 if the 
BHC is a savings institution, 0 otherwise. Our additional control variables are INTDERIV, 
EXEMPT and SECURITIZER.  
INTDERIV is the notional amount of a bank’s interest rate derivatives divided by total assets, 
which we argue captures off-balance-sheet interest rate risks.16 We add this variable because 
                                                 
16 Banks could use interest rate derivatives to hedge on-balance-sheet interest rate risks. Supposing that the 
only purpose that banks use interest rate derivatives is to hedge their on-balance-sheet interest rate risks, a 
higher proportion of interest rate derivatives lead to lower risks and, potentially, lower audit fees. However, 
the notional amount of the derivatives and the amount of the on-balance-sheet position hedged might not be 
the same. (Under the derivative mechanism, the derivative amount is affected by both the amount of the 
hedged position and the date to maturity of the derivative and the hedged position.) While the relation 
between INTDERIV and on-balance-sheet interest rate risks is not clear, we argue it is a good proxy for 
off-balance-sheet risk.  
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interest-rate-sensitivity should be measured both on-balance-sheet (SENSITIVE) and 
off-balance-sheet (INTDERIV). Interest rate risk from on-balance-sheet assets and liabilities 
could be hedged by off-balance-sheet interest rate derivatives, leading to reduced business risk 
and reduced audit fees. On the other hand, interest rate derivatives can be used for speculative 
purposes, thus exaggerating interest rate risk and increasing audit fees. In addition, the 
complexity of derivatives leads to increased audit fees.  
We include EXEMPT to control for the potential effect of banks exempted from reporting on 
internal controls under FDICIA and SOX Section 404. FDICIA Part 363 requires insured 
institutions with $500 million or more in total assets to present management reports on 
compliance and internal control system and those reports must be assured by independent 
auditors. The threshold has increased to $1 billion in total assets from 2005 (FDIC 1993 and 
FDIC 2005). In addition, Section 404 of SOX requires public companies to file a report on the 
auditor’s attestation of the internal control effectiveness, however, non-accelerators with 
market capitalization less than $75 million are exempted from this requirement. Prior research 
suggests that FDICIA has strengthened the banks’ business viability with increased ROA and 
ROE (Carnell 1997) and reduced failure risk (Benston and Kaufman 1998). Under SOX 
Section 404, earnings’ properties improved subsequent to the disclosure of ineffective internal 
control remediation (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008). These findings suggest that there may be 
differences in risk characteristics and financial performance between exempted and 
non-exempted banks. We include SECURITIZER to distinguish securitizers from 
non-securitizers.17 
                                                 








“The attestation and report shall be made in accordance with 
generally accepted standards for attestation engagements or 
the PCAOB's auditing standards.” 
 
















Table 1 tabulates definitions of all variables used in our study. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Asset Securitization Risk Measures 
Asset securitization risks are initially measured using five variables obtained from the FRB 
Y-9C database: SECINC equals securitization income divided by net income; ABS equals 
total outstanding securitized assets, deflated by total assets as per Barth et al. (2012); 
RETINT equals total retained interests (including retained interest only strips, retained credit 
enhancements, and unused commitments to provide liquidity) deflated by total assets as per 
Barth et al. (2012); NPL_SEC equals total nonperforming securitized loans scaled by total 
assets; and CHGOFF_SEC equals total charge-offs for securitized loans scaled by total 
assets. SECINC represents the gains on securitizations; prior research demonstrates that 
manipulating gains on securitizations can be an effective tool in earnings management and 
capital management (Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow 
and Shakespeare 2009). ABS measures the overall level of asset securitization activities, and 
also indicates the maximum level of implicit recourse the BHC might provide on its 
securitized assets. RETINT measures the level of explicit recourse, and may also suggest the 
credit quality of the underlying assets if originating banks choose to retain the lower quality 
tranches. NPL_SEC and CHGOFF_SEC proxy for the securitized asset quality and also relate 
to the relative importance of implicit or explicit recourse, and the potential motivations of 
discretionary accounting. Descriptive statistics of the asset securitization risk variables are 
presented in Panel A of Table 2. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
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Each securitization risk variable captures only specific aspects of the underlying 
securitization risks and includes measurement error (Cheng et al. 2011). To reduce 
measurement error, we follow Cheng et al. (2011) by conducting a principal components 
analysis to generate a composite securitization risk measure, using ABS, RETINT, NPL_SEC 
and CHGOFF_SEC (as shown in Panel B of Table 2, these variables are highly correlated). 
SECINC is not included in the principal components analysis because it is not significantly 
correlated with the other asset securitization risk variables. The results of the principal 
components analysis indicate that ABS, RETINT, NPL_SEC and CHGOFF_SEC load highly 
on one factor, which represents the balance sheet aspect of asset securitization risk, which we 
label SECRISK. This factor has an eigenvalue of 2.186 and explains 55% percent of the 
variance; the factor weights are presented in Panel C of Table 2. SECRISK and SECINC are 
used as the asset securitization risk measures in our main tests. We also test each of the 
individual asset securitization risk variables in our additional analyses. 
It is noted that the mean values of the underlying securitization variables in Table 2, most 
notably ABS and SECINC, and the correlations are significantly lower than those reported in 
Cheng et al. (2011). The sample examined in this study covers both securitizers and 
non-securitizers; while Cheng et al. (2011) only investigate the securitizing bank sample. The 
difference in sample construction contributes to the observed difference in mean values and 
correlations. Furthermore, different sample periods and different data sources in subsequent 
data steps between our study and Cheng et al. (2011) also result in the differences in the 
securitization variable distribution. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 Panel A and Panel B report the descriptive statistics for the pooled data from 2003 to 
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2011 and the pre-GFC, during-GFC and post-FAS166/167 comparison.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
The pooled average audit fees are $1.48 million, with a strong upward trend from pre-GFC 
period, to the during-GFC period and post-FAS166/167 period. The pre-GFC, during-GFC 
and post-FAS166/167 comparison indicates that securitized assets (ABS_AMT) increase 
from $3.60 billion before the GFC to $7.32 billion during the GFC and then decline to $4.62 
billion after the implementation of FAS 166 and FAS 167. Retained interest amount 
(RETINT_AMT) shows a similar pattern. Problematic securitized assets as reflected in 
NPL_SEC_AMT and CHGOFF_SEC_AMT increase significantly with the onset of the GFC 
(after 2007) and stay stable when the FAS 166 and FAS 167 mandate. Although the subperiod 
comparison indicates a slight increase in SECINC_AMT after the onset of the GFC, 
untabulated yearly distribution statistics show that the securitization income drops sharply in 
2008, suggesting the impact of the GFC on securitization income lags to its impact on 
underlying assets’ credit quality.  
The sample is highly skewed with average total asset more than 20 times larger than the 
median for the pooled data and the yearly data (untabulated). This distribution is common in 
bank research (e.g., Fields et al. 2004; Karaoglu 2005; Chen et al. 2008 and Ettredge et al. 
2011), which Fields et al. (2004) attribute to several very large BHCs in the population. The 
proportion of BHCs audited by Big N auditors is 47.3% for the pooled period,  declined  
from 55.2% before the GFC  to 43.5% after the onset of the GFC and further declined to 
40.4% after 2010. Simunic and Stein (1987) and Fields et al. (2004) suggest that the lower 
proportion of Big N auditors for bank audits, compared to other industries, is due to the 
increased litigation risk in the banking industry resulting in a shift from larger to smaller audit 
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firms.18 Ettredge et al. (2011) claim that the decrease in Big N audits of BHCs reflects client 
migration to small auditors after SOX 404 became effective. Our unreported additional 
analysis indicates that the average audit fees and total asset values are all much lower for 
Non-Big N audits than for Big N audits. 
There is a sharp increase in the proportion of BHCs experiencing losses during the GFC, with 
loss rates increased from a pre-GFC 1.6% to a during-GFC 27.5%, and then slightly declined 
to 22.5% after 2010. While commercial loan ratio is generally stable, the ratio mortgage loans 
decreases during the GFC and recovers slightly after 2010. Asset quality deteriorates in these 
years, as reflected in the non-performing loan ratio (NONPERFORM) and charge-off ratio 
(CHGOFF), with worsening management efficiency (INEFFICIENCY) post the onset of the 
GFC. 
BHCs with securitization activities are statistically different from BHCs without 
securitization activities on several different dimensions as indicated by the Satterthwaite 
T-tests reported in Table 3 Panel C. Compared to non-securitizers, securitizers tend to have 
higher audit fees (LNAF), be larger (LNTA) and are more likely to be audited by a Big N 
auditor (BIGN) Securitizers have higher proportions of transaction accounts (TRANSACCT), 
mortgage loans (MTGLOAN), intangible assets (INTANG) and off-balance-sheet interest rate 
derivatives (INTDERIV), and tend to have higher charge-off ratios (CHGOFF) and lower 
inefficiency ratios (INEFFICIENCY). 
Correlations 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations between the regression variables in the pooled 
                                                 
18 Fields et al. (2004) report that more than 70% of BHCs were audited by Big N auditors in 2000. 
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sample. The natural log of audit fees (LNAF) is highly correlated with most of the control 
variables except for CAPRATIO and SECURITIES. It is also noted that LNAF is 
uncorrelated with the income statement aspect asset securitization risk, SECINC.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
The interest derivative measure, INTDERIV, is positively correlated with LNAF. Derivative 
transactions are higher for larger BHCs (LNTA), BHCs with Big N auditors (BIGN), BHCs 
with a higher proportion of commercial loans (COMMLOAN), a higher proportion of 
intangible assets (INTANG), and BHCs with higher levels of problematic loans (CHGOFF 
and NONPERFORM). Derivative positions are lower for BHCs with higher market volatility 
(STDRET) and higher proportion of investment securities. BHCs with higher ratio of interest 
sensitive positions (SENSITIVE) also have higher level of interest rate derivatives.  
FDICIA and SOX Section 404 exempted banks are generally charge lower audit fees 
(LNAF). Exempted banks are lower in total assets (LNTA), less likely audited by Big N 
auditors (BIGN), with lower levels of transaction accounts (TRANSACCT), investment 
securities (SECURITIES), commercial loans (COMMLOAN), intangible assets (INTANG), 
on-balance sheet interest rate sensitive positions (SENSITIVE) and off-balance sheet interest 
derivatives (INTDERIV). Exempted banks are higher in market volatility (STDRET), more 
likely to incur a financial loss (LOSS) and being inefficient (INEFFICIENCY) but less likely 
to write off problematic assets (CHGOFF).  
The asset securitization measures (excluding SECINC) exhibit similar patterns in their 
correlations with a number of control variables. We explain the positive correlation between 
ABS, RETINT and Big N auditors as that the complexity of asset securitization transactions 
and related high litigation risks encourage BHCs to seek a higher audit quality from Big N 
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audit firms. In addition, BHCs with higher a charge off ratio (CHGOFF) and the 
non-performing loan ratio (NONPERFORM) are also more active in asset securitization 
activities, implying that banks with problematic asset quality are more likely involved in asset 
securitization transactions. ABS and RETINT are both positively correlated with INTDERIV; 
RETINT is negatively correlated with EXEMPT. Higher interest rate derivatives concurrent 
with greater credit risk in the underlying securitized assets (NPL_SEC and CHGOFF_SEC); 
while exempted banks are less likely to participate in asset securitization activities and have 
lower credit quality problem on securitized assets.  
V. RESULTS 
We report the regression results for our pooled data, controlling for year fixed effects and 
with standard errors clustered one way on BHCs. Although Gow et al. (2010) indicate that 
two-way clustering is superior compared to one-way clustering method; they admit that “one 
concern with cluster-robust methods is their finite sample properties (e.g., Defond and Hung 
2007)” leading to over-rejecting a true null when the number of clusters is small (Cameron et 
al. 2008; Thompson 2011) and suggest the proper number of clusters should be greater than 
10 (Gow et al. 2010, p. 490). Noting our pooled sample only covers a 9 year span and is 
further divided into 3 sub-periods, the number of year clusters would be too small to generate 
an unbiased result.19  
Validating the Basic Audit Fee Models 
To test model reliability, we first estimate the Fields et al. (2004) model, which does not 
                                                 








consider securitizations and was estimated using cross-sectional data for the year 2000. As 
reported in Column (1) of Table 5, LNTA, BIGN, CAPRATIO, SECURITIES, 20 INTANG, 
NONPERFORM, and INEFFICIENCY are significant at the 0.05 level and have the same 
signs as reported in Fields et al. (2004), but we obtain the opposite sign for MTGLOAN. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
We next extend the Fields et al. (2004) model by adding INTDERIV; this marginally 
improves the model fit, as reported in Column (2). INTDERIV is significant and positive for 
the pooled sample (p < 0.01) and also for the untabulated yearly subsamples. Adding 
EXEMPT into the model further increase the explanation power of the basic model. 
Exempted banks are lower in audit fees at a marginal significant level (p = 0.067). 
Untabulated yearly regression results for the extended model are generally consistent for the 
other independent variables. Similar to the reported pooled result, for each year, LNTA and 
BIGN are positively and MTGLOAN is negatively associated with audit fees. SAVING, 
COMMLOAN and SENSITIVE are not significant in the Fields et al. model or the extended 
model for the pooled and yearly results.22 
Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks  
To test H1, we add the securitization risk factors SECRISK and SECINC to the model. We 
then test H2 by adding the time-period indicator GFC and interaction terms SECRISK*GFC 
and SECINC*GFC. We also split the sample into pre-GFC and during-GFC subsamples to 
compare any changes effected by the GFC. We use the period after the implementation of 
                                                 
20 The sign of our coefficient for SECURITIES is consistent with Fields et al. (2004) because we define it as 
investment securities/total assets and Fields et al. define it as (1 - investment securities)/total assets. 
22 Multicollinearity is not a problem in the basic model as indicated by the highest Variance Inflation Factor 





FAS 166 and FAS 167 (2010-2011) as a benchmark period to investigate if auditors’ attention 
to asset securitization risks eliminates when accounting standards greatly remove the audit 
risks associated with asset securitization risks. The results are reported in Table 6.23 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
H1 is supported. SECRISK and SECINC are significant and positive (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05 
respectively) with other on-balance sheet financial risks controlled, indicating that audit fees 
increase with BHCs’ asset securitization risks in addition to audit risks reflected on the 
balance sheet. Although extant literature shows that inherent risk is positively priced in audit 
fees and this relationship holds for the banking industry (Fields et al. 2004), the supporting 
result on H1 suggests that bank auditors are also attentive to off-balance sheet securitization 
risks during the period 2003-2011. 
The results do not support H2. The CHOW Test suggests a structural change in the model 
after the onset of the GFC and the coefficient for GFC is positive and highly significant. 
Recent research on auditors' fee pressure during the GFC by Ettredge et al. (2013) argues that 
during the crisis client management may demand reduced fees and shows that approximately 
30% audit engagements in 2008 faced fee-pressure.24 Noting the GFC premium is additional 
                                                 
23 The VIFs do not indicate multicollinearity is a problem in the pooled model without the GFC and the related 
interaction terms, where the highest VIF is 3.12. However, when GFC and its interaction terms are added to 
the pooled model, we obtain high VIFs on SECINC and SECINC*GFC. We use centered regressions and 
partitioned sample tests to address this issue. This approach is used in all the other reported regressions 
unless otherwise indicated. 
24 Ettredge et al. (2013) measure the audit fee-pressure by three ways: (1) a client's actual audit fee in 2008 
compared with its audit fee in 2006; (2) a client's actual audit fee in 2008 compared with the benchmark 
audit fee calculated in accordance with Picconi and Reynold (2012) model; and (3) a fee pressure score 
based on (1) and (2). Median values are used to calculate fee-pressure instead of the mean values. They find 
about 30% of the observations experienced positive fee-pressure in 2008. However, they do not actually 
provide evidence of an overwhelming fee-cutting as the mean values of the fee-pressure measures are 
negative, and other 70% observations did not experience fee-pressure according to their fee-pressure 
measurements. 
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to the fee premium adjustments on other inherent risk due to the GFC controlled in the 
model, the result conforms to Hill et al. (1994) that shows an increase in audit fees in a crisis 
environment (Savings and loan crisis) in relation to the increased overwhelming business 
failure and litigation risk, and is consistent with the public intuition that auditors charge 
higher fees across the sector after the onset of the GFC, coexisted with the fee-pressure from 
a large proportion of clients. 
In H2 tests, the coefficient for SECRISK*GFC is not significant and the coefficient for 
SECINC*GFC is significant and negative, indicating that income from securitizations, while 
still positively related to audit fees, became significantly less important post-GFC onset. All 
the results hold for the split sample regressions as shown in Panel B, when we compare the 
pre-GFC and during-GFC sub-periods. The relation for SECINC*GFC seems to be driven by 
the increased number of BHCs reporting a loss in 2008 and 2009.25 The proportion of BHCs 
reporting losses in the during-GFC subperiod is 28 percent, compared to 2 percent in the 
pre-GFC subperiod.26 Reporting a loss, rather than a gain, decreases the likelihood that 
management used the securitization transactions to manage earnings upward, decreasing 
potential audit risk. Therefore, we re-estimated our regressions by splitting the sample into 
BHCs reporting a positive net income (N = 2,647) and BHCs reporting a net loss (N = 404). 
Untabulated results indicate that SECINC is positive and significant for both the pre-GFC ( 
= 0.08; p = 0.015) and during-GFC subsamples ( = 0.18; p = 0.002). The significantly larger 
coefficient for SECINC for the during-GFC subperiod (p = 0.087) supports H2, implying that 
                                                 
25 SECINC decreases from +0.05 in 2007 to -0.24 in 2008, and the percentage of BHCs reporting a loss 
(LOSS) increases from 6 percent in 2007 to 31.5 percent in 2008 and 47.1 percent in 2009.   
26 The proportion of BHCs reporting negative securitization income remained fairly constant, at 11% pre-GFC 
and 10% during-GFC. Excluding BHCs reporting a loss for securitization income does not affect the main 
test results. 
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auditors might put more effort in validating the securitization income but only when BHCs 
report a positive net income, probably due to the earnings management suspicion. 27 Note 
that the contrast group of BHCs with a net loss has less than sufficient observations to 
generate a reliable pre-GFC vs. post-GFC comparison result.  
Column 3 reports the effect of the FAS 166 and FAS 167 on audit pricing to asset 
securitization risks. It is noted that there is a further significant increase in overall audit fees 
after 2010, compared with the pre-2010 period (FAS: coef. = 0.46, p = 0.000) but no 
significant change in the audit pricing to securitization risks. The subperiod statistics suggest 
that for the post-2010 period, auditors don't price the income-related securitization risk, 
SECINC, significantly (p = 0.215) and the coefficient for SECRISK is positive and close to 
the 10% significance level (p = 0.124).  
If we restrict our sample to only BHCs that engage in asset securitizations (securitizer only 
subsample), all of our results are qualitatively the same as those reported above. 
Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks: Further Analyses Using the Individual Asset 
Securitization Risk Variables  
We also individually test each of the correlated asset securitization variables, ABS, RETINT, 
NPL_SEC, and CHGOFF_SEC. Testing on individual securitization variables necessarily 
addresses concerns raised in the main tests in at least two dimensions. First, although the 
component asset securitization risk measure generated by the principal components analysis 
can better capture the comprehensive securitization risks, it is unobservable in practice and 
                                                 
27  Untabulated results after excluding BHCs reporting a securitization loss are consistent with the main test 





could not give us an intuitive picture. Therefore, the individual tests generate additional 
information on how auditors price different aspects of securitization risks respectively. 
Second, due to the high correlations among each other, individual tests are appropriate in this 
study compared to testing all the 5 securitization risk variables in one regression. 
For efficiency, only the results for the four test variables that comprise of the component 
balance sheet securitization risk measure, SECRISK are reported in Table 7. For the pooled 
sample for 2003–2011, the results continue to support H1, with positive and significant 
coefficients for all four variables. The lack of support for H2 is also continued. All the GFC 
interaction terms for the securitization variables are negative. The partitioned comparison 
indicates audit fees increase relative to all four variables pre-GFC, but during-GFC, only 
RETINT remains positive and significant; ABS, NPL_SEC and CHGOFF_SEC become 
non-significant.  
<Insert Table 7 here> 
The FAS 166/167 indicator is positive and significant, suggesting an audit fee increment after 
2010. However, the FAS 166/167 interactions do not show significant difference between the 
pre- vs. post-FAS 166/167 periods in terms of the underlying securitized assets and retained 
interests. RETINT is still positively priced by auditors, indicating retained interests are 
consistently noticed before the GFC, during the GFC and after the effectiveness of the FAS 
166/167. NPL_SEC is marginally positive after 2010; compared with the pre-GFC period, the 
magnitude and the significance level are both reduced; compared with the during-GFC 
period, it shows an increased importance in audit pricing.  
Combining the results shown in Table 6 and Table 7, auditors adjust their risk consideration 
or audit effort in response to overall and specific asset securitization risks for the study 
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period. The GFC audit fee fixed effect is consistent with overall business risk and economic 
changes. The pre-GFC and during-GFC comparisons indicate auditors' focus on securitization 
risks may have changed with the GFC. Starting in 2007 and peaking in 2008, the 
deteriorating market conditions and government proposals encouraged financial institutions 
to re-visit the risk substance of the securitized assets, recognize any losses on the underlying 
securitized assets and increase the retained components on the balance sheet that was initially 
off the balance sheet, to make the retained interests and securitization gains or losses more 
critical in audit risk consideration. Retained interests remained a concern but, as the mean 
level of retained interests rapidly increased during- the GFC period as on-balance sheet 
treatments increased while income statement effects (SECINC) declined, the risks of 
misstatement and audit risk should have fallen correspondingly, reducing audit effort in this 
regard. 
VI.  ROBUSTNESS AND SUPPLEMENTARY TESTS 
Securitizer Self-Selection Bias 
A BHC’s decision to engage in securitization transactions may reflect characteristics of the 
BHC and this self-selection bias may affect our results. Although in the main tests we have 
controlled for SECURITIZER and find it insignificant, we use a Heckman two-stage 
approaches to test whether the results are robust to this endogeneity concern.  
For the Heckman two-stage approach, we formulate the following first stage securitizer 
self-selection model for BHCs:  
SECURITIZER =  + 1LNTA + 2BIGN + 3SECURITIES + 4MTGLOAN + 5SENSITIVE +  (2)
SECURITIZER equals 1 if the bank engages in securitization transactions, 0 otherwise; 
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LNTA is the natural log of total assets; BIGN equals 1 if the incumbent auditor is a Big N 
auditor, 0 otherwise; SECURITIES refers to the investment security assets, including 
held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities divided by total assets; MTGLOAN equals 
mortgage loans/gross loans; CHGOFF is net charge-offs/allowance for loan and lease losses 
and SENSITIVE is the on-balance-sheet interest rate risk measure, defined as (interest 
rate-sensitive assets - interest rate-sensitive liabilities)/total assets. 
We include LNTA because more resources better enable a bank to manage complex activities, 
thus increasing the likelihood it will conduct asset securitization transactions. We include 
BIGN to control for the potential self-selection of auditors by securitizers. We include 
SECURITIES as banks’ investment in securities is often compatible with their asset 
securitization undertaking in practice and banks. We include MTGLOAN because a BHC's 
investment in mortgage loans drives asset securitizations, while the credit capacity released 
by asset securitizations can be re-applied to gear up mortgage loans.  
A critical issue in the application of the Heckman two-stage approach is the appropriateness 
of structural variables in the first stage (Francis et al. 2012). SENSITIVE is used as the 
structural variable in this study as in practice on of the basic functions of asset securitizations 
is to offer matched funding to eliminate funding exposure due to assets-liabilities mismatch 
that can be reflected in the interest-rate sensitivity position (Lederman 1990).30 The first 
stage results confirm that SENSITIVE is significantly associated with securitizer selection. 
SENSITIVE is not related to audit fees as shown in Table 5.  
The Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) from the first stage securitizer selection regression, Model (2), 
                                                 
30 ^ "The Handbook of Asset-Backed Securities", Jess Lederman, 1990. 
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is then included in the second stage model of audit fees, Model (1). In the second stage 
regressions for the full sample of BHCs. Regressions partitioned for pre-GFC and 
during-GFC sub-periods are also estimated. As reported in Table 8, the results are consistent 
with our main test results. IMR is not significant. The coefficients for SECRISK and 
SECINC are consistent with the main test results, both for the pooled years 2003–2011 and 
for the sub-period partitions. These results suggest that self-selection bias is not a problem in 
this study; and even if it exists, it will not distort our results. 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
Regardless of self-selection bias, structural differences between the securitizers and the 
non-securitizers might distort the results for the pooled BHC sample, of which 66% are 
securitizers.31 Untabulated results for the securitizer-only pooled sample are consistent with 
the main test results, with all the securitization risk variables being positive and significant. 
There is a decrease in the importance of asset securitization risks in audit pricing after the 
onset of the GFC with respect to SECINC.  
GFC Cut-off and the Economic Seizure in 2008 and 2009 
Generally the consensus on the GFC commencement and GFC peak are some time points in 
2007 (Erkens et al. 2012; Watts and Zuo 2012). However, the ongoing debate on the 
commencement year of the GFC leads additional sensitivity tests to address the concern on 
the GFC cut-off. Doogar et al. (2012) argue that the period as 2005-2007 are the years leading 
                                                 
31 As reported in Table 3, securitizers have much higher audit fees (LNAF) and larger BHC size (LNTA), a 
higher proportion of securitizers is audited by Big N auditors. Securitizers have lower stock price volatility 
(STDRET), superior management efficiency (INEFFICIENCY) and higher charge off ratios (CHGOFF). In 
terms of asset and liability structure, securitizers have higher proportions of transaction accounts 
(TRANSACCT), mortgage loans (MTGLOAN), intangible assets (INTANG), and off-balance-sheet interest 
rate derivatives (INTDERIV). 
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to the GFC, implying that 2006 has seen some impact of the GFC and 2007 is heavily 
influenced by the GFC shocks. Including 2006 might distort imputed pre-GFC auditor 
behavior because of the likelihood of auditors observing signals of banking distress and 
financial crisis. It might also be argued that the major influences of the financial crisis were 
not reflected in the economy until 2008. Estimating our regressions excluding 2006 and 2007 
observations respectively and changing the GFC cut-off to 2008 does not affect the main test 
results (untabulated). 
Doogar et al. (2012) argue that it is “difficult to predict and analyze audit risk responses in 
2008” due to the complete seizure in the economy prompting unprecedented government 
intervention in the financial markets (Footnote 1, Doogar et al. 2012). An anonymous 
reviewer also notes the difficulties in predicting audit risk responses in 2008 and 2009 for the 
same reason. To address this issue, we retest the pooled sample by excluding 2008 and 2009 
data. The adjusted sample consists of 2,489 BHC-year observations with 3 years’ pre-GFC 
data (N = 1,560, for 2003-2006), 1 year during-GFC data (N = 302 for 2007) and 2 years’ 
post-FAS166/167 data (N = 607 for 2010 and 2011). Excluding 2008 and 2009 data does not 
qualitatively affect the main test results (untabulated).  
The Robustness of the One-way Clustering Results 
We use one-way clustering on BHCs with year fixed to address the clustering effect. 
Although two-way clustering is suggested as a “superior” cluster-robust method (Gow et al. 
2010), Cameron et al. (2008) document that cluster-robust methods are inappropriate when 
the number of clusters is small. Gow et al. (2010) suggest a number of clusters greater than 
10 can produce unequivocally less biased inferences. As our sample only has 10 clusters in 
years and less than 4 clusters in the sub-samples, the one-way clustering should be more 
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appropriate than a two-way clustering method. The robustness tests using a two-way 
clustering on BHCs and on years generate consistent while slightly less significant results 
compared with the main tests (untabulated).  
BHC Size Effect 
Size effect is a common issue in accounting studies. Entity size explains the vast majority of 
the variation in audit fees. Hay et al. (2006) indicate that in audit fee studies, the effect of 
entity size is so significant that we need over 1000 studies with opposite evidence to counter 
the positive effect of size to audit fees. Although our model already includes a continuous 
size variable, BHC size is still critical in three dimensions: (1) the mean value of total asset 
for securitizing firms is nearly eight times the mean of total assets of non-securitizers; and 
very large BHCs are major players in the asset securitization market; (2) the correlation 
between LNTA (the BHC size control variable) and SECRISK is nearly identical to the 
correlation between LNAF (the audit fee measure) and SECRISK; and (3) the almost identify 
correlations with LNTA and LNAF also exist on other control variables in the model. 
Therefore, simply control for the BHC size might not be sufficient to control the 
overwhelming size effect. 
We first address the size effect concern by partitioning the sample based on firm size. Pacconi 
and Reynolds (2009) suggest partitioning the pooled sample into quintiles/deciles in size and 
by year to correct the potential size effect bias. However, this might not be suitable for a 
pooled sample with not very large sample size. In this study, partitioning the sample into 
quintiles or deciles will lead to small subsample size. Our untabulated trial suggests that 
although Pacconi and Reynolds (2009) suggest that partitioning into quintiles and by year can 
increase the explanation power, when we partition our sample by quintile and year, the 
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adjusted R-squared has dropped drastically below 50%. To compromise, we partition the 
pooled sample into half based on the BHC size. Untabulated results indicate that large BHCs 
and small BHCs (above and below median) are significantly different in their financial risks 
and asset securitization risks. Using an indicator variable for large BHCs, untabulated results 
indicate that large BHCs pay lower audit fees than small BHCs after controlling for the other 
factors that affect audit fees. The results from the subsample with a large BHC size are 
consistent with the main tests. It is noted that although the results for the small BHC 
subsample produce less significant (still consistent) results, the magnitudes of securitization 
risk premiums in the small BHC subsample are greater than those for the large BHCs. 
Auditors may charge higher asset securitization premiums for small banks due to concerns 
over their experience and capacity in asset securitization management, also out of the “too 
large to fail” prophecy that large banks are less likely to fail than small banks even under the 
same financial risk status.   
A two-stage residual audit fee model is also used to address the size effect. We first regress 
the basic model (Model 1) by year to get the fitted values and residuals of LNAF; then we 
regress the residuals of LNAF on the test variables in the second stage. The potential size 
effect is assumed to have been controlled within the first stage. The two-stage residual 
method generates consistent results with the main tests. Also noted is that the securitizers are 
clustered in large BHCs, and a securitizer-only subsample test can differentiate the potential 
bias due to the size effect on securitizers. Untabulated results report consistent results for the 
securitizer-only subsample.  
Auditor Switches and Big N Auditors 
We add an auditor change indicator to the model to control for auditor switches, and find no 
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effect on the main results. BHC audit fees are significantly reduced by auditor switches, but 
the interaction term between the auditor change and GFC indicator variables, and the 
pre-GFC and during-GFC sub-period analyses, indicate no significant change in the effects of 
auditor switching on audit fee determination during the GFC.  
Our main results show that auditor type affects audit fees, with Big N auditors having 
systematically higher fees. Therefore, we test whether the effect of securitization risks on 
audit fees differs between Big N and non-Big N auditors. Our untabulated results indicate that 
the GFC indicator, and SECRISK and SECINC are significant and positive for both the Big 
N and non-Big N subgroups. The Big N premium decreases to some extent during the GFC. 
Regulations and Accounting Standards 
The banking industry is under stricter regulation and supervision compared to other 
industries. One example of the multiple layers of regulation on the banking industry is 
FDICIA that requires independent auditors’ attestation on management reports on compliance 
and internal control effectiveness since 1993, implemented ten years earlier than SOX 
Section 404. The requirement of auditors’ attestations on management reports on compliance 
and internal control effectiveness is effective throughout our study period in the banking 
industry with small banks exempted under FDICIA after 1993 and non-accelerators exempted 
under SOX Section 404 after 2004.  
The main tests include EXEMPT as a control variable to identify audit fee premiums due to 
different engagement requirements exempted by FDICIA and SOX Section 404 for small 
BHCs and find significant audit fee premiums on non-exempted banks. Of 3,051 BHC-year 
observations in the sample, 646 BHCs are exempted. Untabulated statistics show that 
exempted banks are much smaller in size; only 13.6% exempted BHCs are audited by Big N 
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auditors compared with 56.4% non-exempted BHCs as Big N clients. Exempted banks have 
higher market volatility, of higher percentage to incur a financial loss, higher proportion of 
mortgage loan involvement while lower proportion on commercial loans. The intangible 
assets including goodwill is lower for exempted banks, and both on-balance sheet and 
off-balance sheet interest rate risks are lower in exempted banks. More importantly, an 
exempted bank is less likely to be a securitizer. The main test results hold for the 
non-exempted banks but not for the exempted banks. We attribute it to the BHC size 
difference between exempted and non-exempted banks and small exempted bank sample size 
(N = 646 for 9 years) and smaller number of exempted banks involved in asset securitization 
transactions.  
FAS 157 issued in September 2006 established a measurement hierarchy for fair value based on 
whether the inputs were “observable” or “unobservable”. Market-priced observable inputs are 
ranked higher and more prioritized over firm-supplied unobservable inputs in fair value 
measurements. When the market price is not observable, firm-supplied fair value, usually 
established with internal model based on assumptions set by the firm itself could be used to 
measure fair value. As criticized by professionals, FAS 157 provides support from accounting 
standards for the discretionary use of internal model in the fair value measurements, which is 
critical in asset securitization transactions, especially in cases where the market inputs are not 
reliable and are poor quality signals (e.g., during crisis period), or when the assets or liabilities 
are distinct from the assets or liabilities with available inputs in the market (e.g., the assets and 
liabilities incurred during individual securitizations).  
We control for Level 3 assets, defined as asset market value is unobservable and its fair value is 
measured based on the bank’s internal model, in the additional tests and argue this category of 
assets are particularly relevant with asset securitization transactions. Doogar et al. (2012) control 
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Level 3 assets for the 2007 dataset. Our data indicates that there are only small number of banks 
report Level 3 asset in 2007 (N=7). Therefore, we start to control Level 3 assets from 2008. 
Controlling for Level 3 assets do not affect the main test results. 
BHC Failure and Distress 
Arguably bank auditors charge fee premiums on banks with anticipated subsequent business 
failure or distress risk, especially in a financial crisis environment (Hill et al. 1994). In 
relation to asset securitization risks, although asset securitization is identified as one of the 
major contributors of the subprime crisis and the subsequent GFC, in which financial 
institutions have experienced extensive financial distress with increased number of bank 
failure record, it is noted that the effect of financial distress threat, if observable, should be 
pervasively in all the risk areas within the financial institution. Facing clients’ business failure 
threat, auditors may generally accelerate the risk consideration to the specific clients and/or 
choose to give special considerations on specific risk areas, for example, the asset 
securitization risks, that are particularly noticeable for distressed bank. Also relevant is the 
“too large to fail” prophecy in the banking industry. Under similar business failure threats, 
large banks will have priority to receive government assistance and remedy due to the critical 
influence of large financial institution failure to the economy; and the finally failed banks are 
usually of not large size. In the additional tests, we control for subsequent failed and 
distressed bank (FAIL). We expect a pervasive fee premium on subsequent failure or distress 
risk (FAIL); we also expect an incremental audit fee premium on asset securitizations and 
other financial risks that are critical to the financial distress for subsequent failed and 
distressed banks compared with non-failed banks.  
The pooled dataset has 221 BHC-year observations labeled as “subsequently failed or 
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distressed banks”, attributable to 38 BHCs with an average total assets of $145 billion, based 
on the FDIC failed bank list.33 Untabulated statistics show that failed and distressed banks 
are marginally larger in size, indicating that the “too large to fail” prophecy may not apply at 
least in the GFC environment when both small and large banks face similar liquidity drainage 
and economic downturn. It is not strange that subsequently failed or distressed BHCs are less 
efficient, suffer greater losses, and have worse charge-off ratio, worse non-performing ratios 
and lower capital ratio. Subsequently failed or distressed banks also have lower levels of 
transaction accounts, smaller investments in securities, lower ratios of commercial loans and 
mortgage loans, lower levels of intangible assets, and are more involved in interest derivative 
transactions compared to non-failed BHCs. Subsequently failed or distressed banks are more 
involved in asset securitization transactions than non-failed BHCs, seemingly show an 
association between asset securitizations and bank failures for the studied period.  
Opposite to our prediction, FAIL, the subsequent failure or distress indicator, is not 
significant in the untabulated regression results. Instead, we find that auditors price 
differently for financial risks and asset securitization risks for non-failed banks and failed 
banks. For subsequently failed or distressed banks, its financial loss position (LOSS) is more 
highlighted by auditors compared with non-failed banks. SECRISK is significant for 
non-failed banks but not significant in the failed or distressed banks. SECINC is more 
focused for subsequently failed or distressed banks both in the magnitude and in its 
significance level, suggesting that auditors were more sensitive to securitization earnings 
                                                 
33 Source: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html 
 FDIC data indicates that, after zero failures in 2005 and 2006, 3 US banks failed in 2007. Failures then 
increased rapidly, with 25 in 2008, 140 in 2009 and 157 in 2010. An additional 13 banks received FDIC 
assistance in 2009-2010. Failure and assistance statistics are from the FDIC site http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/ 
last accessed May 26, 2011. 
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performance when the BHC was in a financial distress.  GFC is a positive and significant 
factor on audit fees for non-distressed banks, but is not significant for failed banks, indicating 
that after the occurrence of the GFC auditors increase audit effort, only for banks without 
observable potential financial distress; for banks under potential financial distress, auditors 
may have already alerted to the risks associated with the distressed BHCs pre-GFC, so audit 
effort is not increased during-GFC, other than in relation to securitization income and the 
overall financial loss position.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We investigate whether asset securitization risks are related to audit fees of bank holding 
companies (BHCs). Using publicly available US BHC data from 2003 to 2011, we find that 
asset securitization risks have a significant and positive association with audit fees, indicating 
auditors were attentive to securitization risks both before and during the global financial 
crisis (GFC). Our results are not driven by self-selection bias and the BHC size effect, and are 
robust to subsample tests omitting non-securitizers, variations in the GFC cut-off year, 
excluding the years under the GFC economic seizure, and split-sample tests for auditor 
changes and auditor type. The variations in relations we observe following the onset of the 
GFC and for financially distressed BHCs suggests auditors have a reasonably nuanced 
appreciation of the risks associated with asset securitization.  
Although several studies in finance and financial accounting have investigated various 
aspects of asset securitization risks, no published study has focused on how asset 
securitizations affect audit fees. This is a significant gap because asset securitizations are 
economically material activities involving significant audit risk and risks of material 
misstatement. Our examination of the relations between asset securitization risks and audit 
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with the distressed BHCs pre-GFC, so audit effort is not increased 
during-GFC, other than in relation to securitization income. ¶
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fees addresses this knowledge gap and is a timely contribution to the auditing and banking 
literature. Using the lens of audit pricing to provide insights into auditors’ behaviors in 
relation to asset securitization risks also contributes to the limited bank auditing literature. 
Our results are relevant to commentators, the audit profession, financial market participants 
and researchers. 
The GFC highlighted the material impact of asset securitization on the economy, financial 
markets and individual firms, and criticisms of auditors’ effort and capability in auditing asset 
securitizations arose after a number of audit failure cases related to asset securitizations in the 
banking industry. In response to the criticism of “where were the auditors in asset 
securitization ?”, our evidence that auditors did respond to asset securitization risks before the 
GFC and that auditors modified their risk focus during the GFC goes some way to countering 
criticisms of the audit profession around the financial crisis. In the UK’s House of Lords 
report, it is stated that audit professionals claim that auditors “do look at the market 
conditions” (p.40, UK House of Lords 2011) and carried out their duties with additional effort 
on asset securitizations. Our results are consistent with those claims.  
The relatively stable regulatory and accounting environment during 2003 to 2009 is an 
excellent context in which to examine the (non)persistence of the auditor behavior in relation 
to asset securitizations when the economic environment changed from prosperity to 
recession. The subsequent post-FAS 166/167 period provide benchmarks when sales 
accounting and non-consolidation of asset securitization have been removed by accounting 
standards that largely decreases audit risks associated with asset securitizations. However, 
there are several limitations to our analyses. Because securitization data only became fully 
available from 2003 and changes in accounting standards in 2009 significantly changed the 
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accounting treatment of securitizations, generalizability of our results might be limited to our 
study period. The seven year span before and during the GFC and the two year benchmark 
post-FAS 166/167 period may not be a sufficient time frame to capture all changes in 
auditors’ responses to securitization issues. Also merely documenting an association between 
audit fees and securitization risks may not give us more insights about how auditors behavior 
responds to securitization risks or the GFC. Without looking at actual labor hours or the 
billing rate charged to the clients, it is impossible to make promising statements about auditor 
responses and behaviour. Moreover, because we consider only the audit effort implications of 
asset securitizations, the public or regulators may look for more direct evidence concerning 
the contribution of audits to reporting quality, and audit quality in relation to securitization 
activities; we leave this opportunity for future research. Nonetheless, our findings that audit 
fees reflect asset securitization risks should be meaningful to the profession and to the 
financial market participants. 
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Variable  Definition 
ABS = total outstanding securitized assets, deflated by total assets. 
ABS_AMT = total outstanding securitized assets. 
AUDIT_FEE = dollar amount of annual audit fee. 
BIGN = 1 if the incumbent auditor is a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise. 
CAPRATIO = risk-adjusted capital ratio, defined as total amount of bank 
regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. 
CHGOFF = net charge-offs/allowance for loan and lease losses. 
CHGOFF_SEC = total charge-offs for securitized loans scaled by total assets. 
CHGOFF_SEC_A
MT 
= total charge-offs for securitized loans. 
COMMLOAN = proportion of commercial loans to gross loans. Commercial loans 
involve commercial and industrial loans, loans to depository 
institutions, acceptances issued by other banks, and agricultural 
loans. 
EXEMPT = 1 if the BHC is exempted under FDICIA and SOX Section 404 
from auditors’ attestation of management reports on compliance 
and internal control effectiveness; and 0 otherwise. 
FAIL = 1 if the BHC or one of its subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy or 
received government financial assistance in the following year. 
FAS166/167 = 1 for years 2010 and 2011 when FAS 166 and FAS 167 were 
implemented, and 0 otherwise. 
GFC = 1 for years from 2007 to 2009, and 0 for years from 2003 to 2006. 
IMR = Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage regression. 
INEFFICIENCY = management efficiency ratio, defined as the ratio of total operating 
expense (including total interest and non-interest expenses) to total 
revenue (including total interest and non-interest revenues). 
INTANG = intangible assets/total assets. 
INTDERIV = notional amount of interest rate derivatives divided by total assets. 
LOSS = 1 if the BHC reports a loss, 0 otherwise. 
LNAF = natural logarithm of annual audit fee. 
LNTA = natural logarithm of total assets. 
MTGLOAN = mortgage loans/gross loans. 
NONPERFORM = non-performing loans/gross loans. Non-performing loans are 
defined as loans ≥ 90 day past due, non-accrual loans, leases and 
other assets. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Variable  Definition 
NPL_SEC_AMT = total nonperforming securitized loans. 
RETINT = total retained interests, including retained interest only strips, 
retained credit enhancements, and unused commitments to provide 
liquidity (service advances), deflated by total assets. 
RETINT_AMT = total retained interests, including retained interest only strips, 
retained credit enhancements, and unused commitments to provide 
liquidity (service advances). 
SAVING = 1 if the BHC is a savings institution, 0 otherwise. 
SECINC = net securitization income divided by net income. 
SECINC_AMT = relative gains on securitization, calculated as the net securitization 
income. 
SECRISK = a composite asset securitization risk measure generated from ABS, 
RETINT, NPL_SEC and CHGOFF_SEC using principal 
components analysis. 
SECURITIES = investment security assets, including held-to-maturity and 
available-for-sale securities, divided by total assets. 
SECURITIZER = 1 if the bank engages in securitization transactions, 0 otherwise. 
SENSITIVE = on-balance-sheet interest rate risk measure, defined as (interest 
rate-sensitive assets - interest rate-sensitive liabilities)/total assets. 
STDRET = one-year standard deviation of daily stock returns. 
TOTAL_ASSETS = total assets of the BHC. 
TRANSACCT = transaction accounts, including non-interest-earning demand 
deposit accounts (DDAs), interest-bearing checking accounts in 
NOW accounts, automatic transfer from savings (ATS) accounts, 








Asset Securitization Risk Measures (N = 3,051) 
Panel A: Distributional Characteristics of the Asset Securitization Risk Variables 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations of the Asset Securitization Risk Variables 
Note: Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. 
Panel C: Weight (Standardized Scoring Coefficients) on the Four Asset Securitization 
Risk Measures in the Component Factor (SECINC excluded due to lack of correlation 
with other variables) 







SECRISK 0.360 0.300 0.384 0.301  54.7% 2.186 
SECINC     N/A   
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
Variables Mean Median Min Q1 Q3 Max Std dev 
ABS 0.020 0 0 0 0 7.678 0.182 
RETINT 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.096 0.005 
NPL_SEC 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.257 0.009 
CHGOFF_SEC 0.000 0 0 0 0 0.074 0.002 
SECINC 0.015 0 -75.340 0 0.019 7.799 1.414 
SECRISK 0.000 -0.175 -0.178 -0.175 0 16.270 0.815 
SECURITIZER 0.664 1 0 0 1 1 0.472 
Variables ABS RETINT NPL_SEC CHGOFF_SEC SECINC SECRISK SECURITIZER 
ABS 1.000             
               
RETINT 0.255 1.000           
 (<.0001)             
NPL_SEC 0.717 0.334 1.000         
 (<.0001) (<.0001)           
CHGOFF_SEC 0.259 0.463 0.335 1.000       
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)         
SECINC 0.018 -0.009 0.022 -0.061 1.000     
 (-0.325) (-0.619) (-0.222) (-0.001)       
SECRISK 0.784 0.653 0.837 0.658 -0.007 1.000   
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.707)     
SECURITIZER 0.078 0.079 0.084 0.056 0.008 0.000 1.000 




Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
Panel A: Pooled BHC data from 2003 to 2011 
 Pooled BHC Data from 2003 to 2011 
 Mean Median Min Q1 Q3 Max Std dev 
N 3051 
Dependent Variable   
AUDIT_FEE ($,000) 1,478.738 289.700  0.683 147.000 672.800 96,600.000 6,404.928 
LNAF 12.780 12.577 6.528 11.898 13.419 18.386 1.300 
Test Variables   
ABS_AMT ($,000) 4,861,626 0 0 0 0 972,037,261 42,798,590 
RETINT_AMT ($,000) 119,709 0 0 0 0 99,821,000 1,980,348 
NPL_SEC_AMT ($,000) 550,966 0 0 0 0 207,818,046 7,458,846 
CHGOFF_SEC_AMT 
($,000) 
83,616 0 -39,000 0 0 36,706,288 1,097,637 
SECINC_AMT ($,000) 78,876 24 -4,774,000 0 474 11,657,985 691,486 
ABS 0.020096 0 0 0 0 7.678218 0.182359 
RETINT 0.000543 0 0 0 0 0.095664 0.004915
NPL_SEC 0.001067 0 0 0 0 0.257472 0.009029 
CHGOFF_SEC 0.000180 0 -0.000068 0 0 0.074002 0.002268 
SECINC 0.015370 0.000295 -75.340428 0 0.019272 7.799074 1.414033 
SECRISK 0.000000 -0.174741 -0.177879 -0.174741 0 16.269652 0.815023
Control Variables        
TOTAL ASSETS 
($,000) 
30,239,891 1,706,423 158,719 814,316 5,224,412 2,268,347,377 178,052,313 
LNTA 21.640 21.258 18.883 20.518 22.377 28.450 1.626 
BIGN 0.473 0 0 0 1 1 0.499 
STDRET 0.345 0.080 0.007 0.021 0.703 38.455 0.865 
SAVING 0.060 0 0 0 0 1 0.238
LOSS 0.132 0 0 0 0 1 0.339 
CAPRATIO 13.990 13.230 -2.630 11.750 15.220 99.910 5.062 
TRANSACCT 0.584 0.588 0 0.490 0.690 0.999 0.155 
SECURITIES 0.206 0.187 0 0.127 0.268 0.941 0.117 
COMMLOAN 0.165 0.147 0 0.094 0.212 0.782 0.102 
MTGLOAN 0.300 0.296 0 0.197 0.381 1.000 0.149 
INTANG 0.017 0.010 0 0.002 0.025 0.311 0.022 
CHGOFF 0.404 0.280 0 0.127 0.565 3.532 0.405
NONPERFORM 0.019 0.009 0 0.004 0.024 0.500 0.027 
INEFFICIENCY 0.774 0.752 0.334 0.692 0.818 3.243 0.163 
SENSITIVE 0.089 0.085 -6.627 -0.016 0.205 0.848 0.217 
INTDERIV 0.343 0.003 0 0 0.045 56.268 2.881
EXEMPT 0.212 0 0 0 0 1 0.409 
SECURITIZER 0.664 1 0 0 1 1 0.472 
Note 1: Satterthwaite t test is used. This is an alternative to the pooled-variance t test and is used when the assumption that the 
two populations have unequal variances. It provides a t statistic that symptotically approaches a t distribution, allowing for an 
approximate t test to be calculated. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% based on two-tailed tests. 















in Means Pre- vs. During-GFC1 
Post-FAS 166/167 
(2010-2011) 
Difference in Means between 
During-GFC vs. Post-FAS166/167 
 Mean Mean T-stat p-value Mean T-stat p-value 
N 1560 864   627   
Dependent Variable        
AUDIT_FEE ($,000) 1,071.581      1,669.092 -2.30 0.022  2,229.454 -1.26 0.207 
LNAF 12.557 13.021 -8.80 <.0001 13.003 0.27 0.790
Test Variables        
ABS_AMT ($,000) 3,596,544 7,323,129 -1.69 0.091 4,617,272 1.04 0.300 
RETINT_AMT ($,000) 77,733 249,470 -1.39 0.164 45,338 1.64 0.100
NPL_SEC_AMT ($,000) 172,614 939,477 -2.08 0.038 956,953 -0.03 0.974 
CHGOFF_SEC_AMT ($,000) 36,730 141,709 -1.89 0.059 120,220 0.27 0.784 
SECINC_AMT ($,000) 84,322 99,063 -0.46 0.649 37,508 1.84 0.066 
ABS 0.026336 0.013961 1.86 0.064 0.013024 0.23 0.817
RETINT 0.000642 0.000558 0.37 0.711 0.000279 1.10 0.269 
NPL_SEC 0.001013 0.001031 -0.05 0.959 0.001253 -0.53 0.598 
CHGOFF_SEC 0.000202 0.000182 0.22 0.825 0.000121 0.86 0.390
SECINC 0.044764 -0.054462 1.13 0.260 0.038467 -1.02 0.307
SECRISK 0.016730 -0.011987 0.88 0.378 -0.025107 0.42 0.672 
Control Variables        
TOTAL ASSETS ($,000) 21,246,450 37,190,078 -2.02 0.044  43,038,626 -0.50 0.619
LNTA 21.436 21.867 -6.38 <.0001 21.835 0.38 0.707 
BIGN 0.522 0.435 4.14 <.0001 0.404 1.22 0.221 
STDRET 0.340 0.290 3.14 0.002 0.436 -2.06 0.040
SAVING 0.062 0.039 2.47 0.014 0.086 -3.59 0.000 
LOSS 0.016 0.275 -16.70 <.0001 0.225 2.24 0.025 
CAPRATIO 13.759 13.289 2.09 0.037 15.531 -8.35 <.0001 
TRANSACCT 0.583 0.547 5.67 <.0001 0.638 -11.45 <.0001 
SECURITIES 0.219 0.179 8.55 <.0001 0.212 -5.93 <.0001 
COMMLOAN 0.167 0.167 0.01 0.989 0.159 1.57 0.116 
MTGLOAN 0.304 0.283 3.38 0.001 0.316 -4.55 <.0001 
INTANG 0.017 0.020 -2.90 0.004 0.015 4.59 <.0001 
CHGOFF 0.236 0.515 -16.83 <.0001 0.668 -6.37 <.0001 
NONPERFORM 0.007 0.027 -18.22 <.0001 0.038 -6.28 <.0001 
INEFFICIENCY 0.738 0.833 -12.57 <.0001 0.784 4.59 <.0001
SENSITIVE 0.106 0.059 5.39 <.0001 0.088 -3.10 0.002 
INTDERIV 0.254 0.320 -0.63 0.530 0.600 -1.44 0.151 
EXEMPT 0.221 0.188 1.99 0.047 0.222 -1.61 0.108 





Panel C: Securitizers and Non-securitizers from 2003 to 2011 
 Non-Securitizer Securitizer 
Difference 
in Means1 
 Mean Median Min Max Std dev Mean Median Min Max Std dev T-stat p-value 
N 1024     2027       
Dependent Variable      
AUDIT_FEE ($,000) 602.844 189.010 9.500 46,600.000 3,007.525 1,921.223 380.300 0.683 96,600.000 7,523.728 -6.88 <.0001 
LNAF 12.245 12.150 9.159 17.657 1.033 13.050 12.849 6.528 18.386 1.337 -18.36 <.0001 
Test Variables      
ABS_AMT ($,000)    7,317,623 0 0 972,037,261 52,340,646
RETINT_AMT ($,000)      180,184 0 0 99,821,000 2,427,563   
NPL_SEC_AMT ($,000)      829,302 0 0 207,818,046 9,139,075   
CHGOFF_SEC_AMT 
($,000) 
     
125,858 0 -39,000 36,706,288 1,344,780 
  
SECINC_AMT ($,000)      118,723 223 -4,774,000 11,657,985 845,632   
ABS      0.030248 0 0 7.678218 0.223060   
RETINT    0.000818 0 0 0.095664 0.006012
NPL_SEC      0.001607 0 0 0.257472 0.011039   
CHGOFF_SEC      0.000270 0 -0.000068 0.074002 0.002778   
SECINC    0.023135 0.008551 -75.340428 7.799074 1.7349097
SECRISK      0.000000 -0.174741 -0.177879 16.269652 1   
Control Variables             
TOTAL ASSETS ($,000) 5,577,701 1,009,121 158,719 558,563,489 34,994,898 42,698,738 2,391,012 180,570 2,268,347,377 215,974,505 -7.54 <.0001 
LNTA 20.957 20.732 18.883 27.049 1.149 21.985 21.595 19.012 28.450 1.720 -19.61 <.0001 
BIGN 0.279 0 0 1 0.449 0.571 1 0 1 0.495 -16.38 <.0001 
STDRET 0.450 0.313 0.009 5.011 0.430 0.293 0.056 0.007 38.455 1.013 5.99 <.0001 
SAVING 0.039 0 0 1 0.194 0.071 0 0 1 0.257 -3.84 0.000 
LOSS 0.142 0 0 1 0.349 0.128 0 0 1 0.334 1.05 0.294 
CAPRATIO 13.980 13.45 -2.63 40.84 3.444 13.995 13.09 -1.26 99.91 5.708 -0.09 0.925 
TRANSACCT 0.568 0.561 0 0.999 0.166 0.592 0.598 0 0.964 0.148 -3.90 <.0001 
SECURITIES 0.210 0.184 0.002 0.941 0.133 0.205 0.188 0.000 0.779 0.108 1.09 0.278 
COMMLOAN 0.161 0.129 0.000 0.782 0.117 0.168 0.157 0.000 0.626 0.094 -1.73 0.084 
MTGLOAN 0.275 0.268 0 1.000 0.139 0.313 0.309 0 0.990 0.152 -6.87 <.0001 
INTANG 0.011 0.006 0 0.125 0.015 0.021 0.014 0 0.311 0.024 -13.60 <.0001 
CHGOFF 0.368 0.219 0 3.532 0.429 0.422 0.312 0 3.328 0.392 -3.35 0.001
NONPERFORM 0.018 0.007 0 0.500 0.030 0.020 0.010 0 0.278 0.025 -1.26 0.206 
INEFFICIENCY 0.789 0.765 0.421 2.167 0.167 0.767 0.747 0.334 3.243 0.161 3.54 0.000 
SENSITIVE 0.081 0.072 -0.535 0.848 0.185 0.093 0.094 -6.627 0.715 0.231 -1.51 0.131
INTDERIV 0.025 0 0 1.438 0.070 0.505 0.0085233 0 56.268 3.524 -6.13 <.0001 




Pearson Correlations (N = 3,051 Sample Period: 2003–2011) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. LNAF 1.000                                  
2. LNTA 0.918c 1.000                                
3. BIGN 0.588c 0.545c 1.000                              
4. STDRET -0.220c -0.250c -0.175c 1.000                            
5. SAVING -0.093c -0.095c -0.064c 0.055c 1.000                          
6. LOSS 0.050c -0.012 -0.111c 0.038b -0.010 1.000                        
7. CAPRATIO 0.070c 0.009 0.056c 0.003 0.039b -0.105c 1.000                      
8. TRANSACCT 0.148c 0.160c 0.199c -0.088c -0.020 -0.174c 0.131c 1.000                    
9. SECURITIES 0.003 0.027 0.164c -0.005 -0.048c -0.158c 0.290c 0.128c 1.000                  
10. COMMLOAN 0.194c 0.183c 0.220c -0.099c -0.109c -0.083c -0.039b 0.279c -0.017 1.000                
11.MTGLOAN -0.077c -0.010 -0.025 0.051c 0.195c -0.048c 0.004 -0.041b 0.098c -0.446c 1.000              
12. INTANG 0.414c 0.403c 0.268c -0.145c 0.023 -0.109c 0.328c 0.186c -0.047c 0.043b 0.005 1.000            
13. CHGOFF 0.222c 0.175c -0.020 0.020 -0.036b 0.505c 0.123c -0.049c -0.119c 0.016 -0.060c 0.052c 1.000          
14. NONPERFORM 0.139c 0.074c -0.084c 0.183c -0.020 0.537c -0.033a -0.154c -0.097c -0.085c -0.029 -0.091c 0.502c 1.000        
15. INEFFICIENCY -0.069c -0.147c -0.181c 0.183c 0.026 0.558c -0.133c -0.226c -0.079c -0.108c 0.024 -0.140c 0.297c 0.336c 1.000      
16. SENSITIVE 0.228c 0.233c 0.193c -0.078c -0.051c -0.070c 0.038b 0.273c -0.119c 0.217c -0.178c 0.090c -0.027 -0.081c -0.133c 1.000    
17. INTDERIV 0.389c 0.403c 0.119c -0.032a -0.022 -0.020 0.007 0.014 -0.090c 0.057c 0.011 0.077c 0.092c 0.037b -0.013 0.069c 1.000  
18. EXEMPT -0.468c -0.501c -0.350c 0.279c 0.148c 0.039b 0.016 -0.159c -0.040b -0.154c 0.057c -0.229c -0.073c 0.022 0.155c -0.117c -0.060c 1.000 
19. SECURITIZER 0.293c 0.299c 0.276c -0.086c 0.063c -0.019 0.001 0.073c -0.021 0.034a 0.120c 0.208c 0.062c 0.024 -0.065c 0.025 0.079c -0.216c 
20. ABS 0.166c 0.170c 0.065c -0.028 0.042b -0.001 0.047c -0.004 -0.040b -0.048c 0.141c 0.147c 0.058c 0.041b -0.019 0.051c 0.091c -0.019 
21. RETINT 0.207c 0.206c 0.115c -0.038b -0.014 0.020 0.080c -0.061c 0.000 -0.032a -0.023 0.107c 0.091c 0.086c -0.055c 0.034a 0.100c -0.057c 
22. NPL_SEC 0.273c 0.277c 0.108c -0.037b 0.072c 0.030a 0.035a -0.008 -0.062c -0.042b 0.166c 0.148c 0.086c 0.115c -0.014 0.065c 0.248c -0.052c 
23. CHGOFF_SEC 0.182c 0.186c 0.083c -0.028 -0.020 0.000 0.093c -0.037 -0.048c -0.016 -0.035a 0.121c 0.114c 0.027 -0.045b 0.030a 0.161c -0.041b 
24. SECINC 0.000 -0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.005 -0.072c -0.001 0.007 -0.006 0.007 0.019 -0.025 -0.014 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.027 0.001 
25. SECRISK 0.253c 0.256c 0.097c -0.036b 0.026 0.020 0.083c -0.042b -0.051c -0.051c 0.085c 0.158c 0.110c 0.090c -0.036b 0.060c 0.199c -0.035c 
Note: Two-tailed p-values: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05; c p < 0.01. The Pearson correlations between the individual asset securitization risk variables are presented in Table 2. 





Basic Model Fitting and Validation of Audit Fee Model 
  
Pooled Sample: 2003 to 2011 (Dependent Variable: 
LNAF) 
   
  
(1) Fields et al. (2004) 
Model 
(2) Extended Model 




Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value 
INTERCEPT + -2.28 -5.57 0.000 -1.83 -4.05 0.000 -1.66 -3.28 0.001 
LNTA + 0.65 34.06 0.000 0.63 29.56 0.000 0.62 26.20 0.000
BIGN + 0.43 11.93 0.000 0.44 12.31 0.000 0.44 12.37 0.000 
STDRET + -0.01 -0.64 0.261 -0.01 -0.80 0.212 -0.01 -0.64 0.260 
SAVING + 0.02 0.30 0.381 0.02 0.29 0.386 0.02 0.47 0.319
LOSS + 0.01 0.14 0.443 0.02 0.45 0.327 0.02 0.45 0.325 
CAPRATIO + 0.02 5.17 0.000 0.02 5.01 0.000 0.02 5.02 0.000 
TRANSACCT + 0.03 0.28 0.388 0.04 0.34 0.368 0.03 0.24 0.405 
SECURITIES + -0.34 -2.11 0.018 -0.26 -1.65 0.050 -0.26 -1.64 0.051
COMMLOAN + -0.01 -0.04 0.485 -0.02 -0.05 0.479 -0.02 -0.06 0.476 
MTGLOAN + -0.50 -3.37 0.000 -0.50 -3.31 0.001 -0.49 -3.24 0.001 
INTANG + 1.14 1.38 0.084 1.51 1.79 0.037 1.49 1.78 0.038 
CHGOFF + 0.05 1.28 0.100 0.05 1.26 0.104 0.05 1.20 0.116 
NONPERFORM + 2.93 3.65 0.000 2.98 3.69 0.000 2.99 3.67 0.000 
INEFFICIENCY + 0.45 4.40 0.000 0.42 4.08 0.000 0.42 4.14 0.000
SENSITIVE - 0.00 -0.04 0.483 0.01 0.19 0.423 0.02 0.29 0.387 
INTERDIV  - - - 0.02 3.57 0.000 0.02 3.58 0.000 
EXEMPT  - - - - - - -0.06 -1.50 0.067 
  
Year Indicators 
Clustered on BHCs 
Year Indicators 
Clustered on BHCs 
Year Indicators 
Clustered on BHCs 
N  3,051 3,051 3,051
Adjusted R2  0.889 0.890 0.891
F-Value  222.18; p < .0001 254.63; p < .0001 243.65; p < .0001
Note: Standard errors are clustered on BHCs and models control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed because of 
directional predictions.  





Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks 
Panel A: Pooled BHC Data 2003-2011 
 Pooled 2003–2011 
Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value 
INTERCEPT -1.53 -2.92 0.002 -1.54 -2.92 0.002 -1.55 -2.94 0.002 
SECRISK 0.04 2.98 0.002 0.03 2.16 0.016 0.04 3.21 0.001 
SECINC 0.01 1.87 0.031 0.10 2.74 0.003 0.01 2.13 0.017 
GFC    0.46 11.70 0.000    
SECRISK*GFC    -0.01 -0.46 0.322    
SECINC*GFC    -0.10 -2.66 0.004    
FAS       0.46 11.67 0.000 
SECRISK*FAS       -0.02 -0.67 0.252 
SECINC*FAS       -0.03 -0.71 0.240 
LNTA 0.61 24.74 0.000 0.61 24.68 0.000 0.61 24.75 0.000 
BIGN 0.44 12.16 0.000 0.44 12.13 0.000 0.44 12.17 0.000 
STDRET -0.01 -0.57 0.283 -0.01 -0.60 0.276 -0.01 -0.60 0.275 
SAVING 0.02 0.33 0.369 0.02 0.32 0.376 0.02 0.32 0.375 
LOSS 0.02 0.56 0.287 0.03 0.62 0.268 0.02 0.50 0.309 
CAPRATIO 0.02 5.10 0.000 0.02 5.17 0.000 0.02 5.10 0.000 
TRANSACCT 0.04 0.33 0.371 0.04 0.35 0.362 0.04 0.34 0.367 
SECURITIES -0.23 -1.48 0.069 -0.22 -1.43 0.077 -0.24 -1.50 0.068 
COMMLOAN -0.01 -0.03 0.488 0.00 -0.01 0.496 -0.01 -0.02 0.493 
MTGLOAN -0.53 -3.46 0.000 -0.52 -3.42 0.000 -0.52 -3.44 0.000 
INTANG 1.35 1.65 0.050 1.37 1.67 0.048 1.34 1.63 0.052 
CHGOFF 0.04 1.00 0.158 0.04 0.92 0.179 0.04 1.00 0.160 
NONPERFORM 2.80 3.58 0.000 2.87 3.57 0.000 2.84 3.55 0.000 
INEFFICIENCY 0.43 4.16 0.000 0.43 4.13 0.000 0.43 4.18 0.000 
SENSITIVE  0.01 0.27 0.393 0.02 0.33 0.372 0.02 0.28 0.388 
INTDERIV 0.02 3.57 0.000 0.02 3.56 0.000 0.02 3.55 0.000 
EXEMPT -0.07 -1.60 0.055 -0.07 -1.60 0.055 -0.07 -1.59 0.056 
SECURITIZER 0.03 0.95 0.171 0.03 0.84 0.200 0.03 0.94 0.174 
Chow Test (GFC)  4.72; p < .0001 2.12; p < .0001 
N 3,051 3,051 3,051 
Adj. R2 0.891 0.891 0.891 
F-Stat. 262.42; p < .0001 244.65; p < .0001 236.37; p <. 0001 
Note: Standard errors are clustered on BHCs and models control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed because of 
directional predictions. Chow Tests indicate any difference in model structure before and after the onset of the GFC with the 




Panel B: Before the GFC, During the GFC and After FAS 166/167 Comparison 
Model 1 Results (Dependent Variable: LNAF) 
Before the GFC (2003–2006) During the GFC (2007–2009) 
After FAS166 and FAS167 
(2010–2011) 
Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value 
INTERCEPT -1.83 -2.89 0.002 -0.47 -0.73 0.232 -1.32 -2.05 0.021 
SECRISK 0.03 2.57 0.005 0.04 1.47 0.072 0.04 1.16 0.124 
SECINC 0.08 2.15 0.016 0.00 2.65 0.004 -0.03 -0.79 0.215
LNTA 0.60 22.34 0.000 0.59 19.84 0.000 0.63 20.19 0.000 
BIGN 0.46 11.49 0.000 0.40 7.97 0.000 0.39 7.29 0.000 
STDRET -0.19 -3.00 0.001 -0.01 -0.19 0.424 0.00 0.12 0.451 
SAVING -0.01 -0.13 0.448 0.03 0.34 0.365 0.04 0.62 0.267 
LOSS -0.11 -0.62 0.269 0.09 1.75 0.040 0.05 0.82 0.205 
CAPRATIO 0.01 2.14 0.016 0.01 4.24 0.000 0.03 5.81 0.000 
TRANSACCT 0.31 2.42 0.008 -0.12 -0.75 0.228 -0.23 -1.20 0.115 
SECURITIES -0.37 -2.37 0.009 0.24 0.97 0.166 -0.36 -1.45 0.074 
COMMLOAN -0.01 -0.03 0.489 0.01 0.02 0.493 -0.50 -1.24 0.108 
MTGLOAN -0.39 -2.60 0.005 -0.64 -2.99 0.002 -0.95 -4.58 0.000 
INTANG 2.08 2.20 0.014 0.47 0.43 0.333 1.02 0.78 0.217 
CHGOFF 0.15 1.79 0.037 0.05 1.07 0.142 -0.07 -1.21 0.114 
NONPERFORM 6.45 2.33 0.010 2.25 1.98 0.025 2.37 2.90 0.002 
INEFFICIENCY 1.22 5.16 0.000 0.14 1.67 0.048 0.48 3.74 0.000 
SENSITIVE  -0.01 -0.25 0.403 0.10 0.84 0.202 0.16 1.42 0.078 
INTDERIV 0.02 2.34 0.010 0.02 2.75 0.003 0.02 3.23 0.001 
EXEMPT -0.03 -0.56 0.288 -0.02 -0.33 0.372 -0.08 -1.47 0.071 
SECURITIZER 0.00 -0.01 0.496 0.05 1.11 0.134 0.06 1.17 0.121 
          
N 1560 864 627 
Adj. R2 0.882 0.895 0.916 
F-Stat. 222.40; p < .0001 196.66; p < .0001 354.09; p < .0001 
Note: Standard errors are clustered on BHCs and models control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed because of 
directional predictions. Chow Tests indicate any difference in model structure before and after the onset of the GFC with the 
break point as 2007.  




Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks: Using the Individual Asset Securitization Risk 
Variables, ABS, RETINT, NPL_SEC and CHGOFF_SEC as Test Variables 
 
Panel A: Pooled BHC Data 2003-2011 
Model 1 Using individual Asset Securitization Risk Variables (Dependent Variable: LNAF) 
Pooled 2003–2011 
Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value 
Panel A: ABS              
ABS 0.16 2.8 0.003 0.18 2.94 0.002 0.17 2.90 0.002 
GFC     0.46 11.70 0.000      
ABS*GFC     -0.26 -1.28 0.100      
FAS         0.46 11.78 0.000 
ABS*FAS         -0.12 -0.54 0.295 
Adj. R2 0.891 0.891 0.891 
F-Stat. 234.33; p < .0001 225.47; p < .0001 225.86; p < .0001 
Panel B: RETINT              
RETINT 3.81 2.92 0.002 4.48 2.12 0.017 3.82 2.72 0.003 
GFC     0.46 11.52 0.000      
RETINT*GFC     -1.29 -0.67 0.253      
FAS         0.45 11.53 0.000 
RETINT*FAS         -0.08 -0.05 0.480 
Adj. R2 0.891 0.891 0.891 
F-Stat. 340.77; p < .0001 371.86; p < .0001 482.02; p < .0001 
Panel C: NPL_SEC              
NPL_SEC 3.86 3.68 0.000 5.14 4.05 0.000 4.21 4.14 0.000 
GFC     0.46 11.79 0.000      
NPL_SEC*GFC     -3.82 -1.80 0.036      
FAS         0.46 11.82 0.000 
NPL_SEC*FAS         -2.06 -1.36 0.087 
Adj. R2 0.891 0.891 0.891 
F-Stat. 261.43; p < .0001 236.35; p < .0001 253.88; p < .0001 
Panel D: 
CHGOFF_SEC 
             
CHGOFF_SEC 3.66 1.26 0.104 5.25 2.01 0.023 4.49 1.76 0.039 
GFC     0.45 11.43 0.000      
CHGOFF_SEC*GFC     -9.43 -1.00 0.159      
FAS         0.45 11.46 0.000 
CHGOFF_SEC*FAS         -17.11 -1.42 0.078 
Adj. R2 0.891 0.891 0.891 




Panel B: Before the GFC, During the GFC and After FAS 166/167 Comparison 
 Model 1 Using individual Asset Securitization Risk Variables (Dependent Variable: LNAF) 
 Before the GFC (2003–2006) During the GFC (2007–2009) During the GFC (2010–2011) 
 Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value 
Panel A: ABS             
ABS 0.14 2.55 0.006 0.05 0.19 0.426 0.18 0.67 0.253 
Adj. R2 0.881 0.895 0.916 
F-Stat. 213.95; p < .0001 164.17; p < .0001 302.55; p < .0001 
Panel B: RETINT             
RETINT 4.96 2.25 0.013 3.64 3.39 0.000 3.60 2.37 0.009 
Adj. R2 0.881 0.895 0.916 
F-Stat. 250.10; p < .0001 369.59; p < .0001 435.49; p < .0001 
Panel C: NPL_SEC         
NPL_SEC 4.31 3.30 0.001 2.46 0.91 0.182 3.71 1.61 0.054 
Adj. R2 0.881 0.895 0.917 
F-Stat. 219.79; p < .0001 171.56; p < .0001 418.31; p < .0001 
Panel D: 
CHGOFF_SEC 
            
CHGOFF_SEC 6.08 2.35 0.010 6.44 0.76 0.223 -6.80 -0.46 0.324 
Adj. R2 0.881 0.895 0.916 
F-Stat. 299.01; p < .0001 167.40; p < .0001 295.73; p < .0001 
          
N 1,560 864 627
Note: Standard errors are clustered on BHCs and models control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed because of 
directional predictions. 




Heckman Two-Stage Approach: Controlling for Self-Selection of Securitization Activities 
Panel A: Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks 
 1st Stage Selection 
(Dependent Variable: 
SECURITIZER) 
2nd Stage Estimates (Both Securitizers and Non-Securitizers) 
(Dependent Variable: LNAF) 
 Coef Chi-Sq  p-value Coef T-Stat  p-value Coef T-Stat  p-value Coef T-Stat  p-value 
INTERCEPT -5.70 131.73 0.000 -1.59 -3.51 0.000 -1.59 -3.51 0.000 -1.61 -3.55 0.000 
SECRISK    0.04 3.02 0.001 0.03 2.15 0.016 0.04 3.25 0.001 
SECINC    0.01 1.87 0.031 0.10 2.74 0.003 0.01 2.13 0.017 
GFC       0.47 11.45 0.000    
SECRISK*GFC       -0.01 -0.49 0.312    
SECINC*GFC       -0.10 -2.65 0.004    
FAS          0.46 11.43 0.000 
SECRISK*FAS          -0.02 -0.68 0.247 
SECINC*FAS          -0.03 -0.71 0.240 
IMR    0.04 0.16 0.435 0.04 0.17 0.434 0.04 0.18 0.429 
LNTA 0.27 130.17 0.000 0.62 26.67 0.000 0.62 26.61 0.000 0.62 26.79 0.000 
BIGN 0.47 61.76 0.000 0.45 6.03 0.000 0.45 6.00 0.000 0.45 6.05 0.000 
SECURITIES -1.15 27.53 0.000 -0.26 -1.14 0.126 -0.25 -1.11 0.134 -0.26 -1.16 0.123 
MTGLOAN 1.48 64.45 0.000 -0.50 -1.96 0.025 -0.50 -1.94 0.027 -0.50 -1.95 0.026 
SENSITIVE -0.32 5.25 0.011          
STDRET    -0.01 -0.58 0.282 -0.01 -0.60 0.275 -0.01 -0.60 0.274 
SAVING    0.02 0.33 0.372 0.02 0.31 0.380 0.02 0.31 0.378 
LOSS    0.02 0.56 0.287 0.03 0.62 0.268 0.02 0.50 0.309 
CAPRATIO    0.02 5.18 0.000 0.02 5.24 0.000 0.02 5.18 0.000 
TRANSACCT    0.04 0.34 0.366 0.04 0.38 0.353 0.04 0.35 0.362 
COMMLOAN    -0.01 -0.03 0.486 0.00 -0.01 0.495 -0.01 -0.02 0.491 
INTANG    1.34 1.65 0.050 1.36 1.66 0.049 1.33 1.63 0.052 
CHGOFF    0.04 1.00 0.158 0.04 0.92 0.179 0.04 0.99 0.160 
NONPERFORM    2.80 3.60 0.000 2.86 3.58 0.000 2.84 3.57 0.000 
INEFFICIENCY    0.43 4.19 0.000 0.43 4.16 0.000 0.43 4.21 0.000 
INTDERIV    0.02 3.79 0.000 0.02 3.74 0.000 0.02 3.75 0.000 
EXEMPT    -0.07 -1.45 0.074 -0.07 -1.45 0.074 -0.07 -1.44 0.075 
SECURITIZER    -0.03 -0.07 0.471 -0.03 -0.08 0.467 -0.03 -0.09 0.465 
     
Adj. R2* 0.199 0.891 0.891 0.891 
N 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 
*Max-rescaled R-square is reported for the 1st stage selection model. The second stage tests are clustered on BHCs with year effect controlled.  
All the results reported in this paper are one-tailed because of directional predictions. 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel B: Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks for the Before the GFC. During the GFC and After FAS166/167 Comparison 
 Before the GFC (2003–2006) During the GFC (2007–2009) After FAS166/167 (2010-2011) 
 
1st Stage Selection 
(Dependent Variable: 
SECURITIZER) 
2nd Stage Estimates 




1st Stage Selection 
(Dependent Variable: 
SECURITIZER) 






1st Stage Selection 
(Dependent Variable: 
SECURITIZER) 
2nd Stage Estimates 


































INTERCEPT -6.55 86.03 0.000 -1.74 -3.32 0.001 -5.30 26.97 0.000 -0.78 -1.37 0.086 -4.95 18.77 0.000 -1.65 -2.64 0.004 
SECRISK    0.03 2.59 0.005    0.04 1.32 0.094    0.04 1.02 0.155 
SECINC    0.08 2.19 0.015    0.00 2.56 0.006    -0.03 -0.76 0.223 
IMR    -0.06 -0.18 0.427    0.22 0.80 0.211    0.16 0.57 0.285 
LNTA 0.31 84.65 0.000 0.59 20.38 0.000 0.25 27.43 0.000 0.62 21.78 0.000 0.22 16.90 0.000 0.65 19.16 0.000 
BIGN 0.46 31.33 0.000 0.44 4.46 0.000 0.47 15.00 0.000 0.46 4.90 0.000 0.48 11.31 0.000 0.44 4.57 0.000 
SECURITIES -1.10 14.54 0.000 -0.35 -1.55 0.061 -1.77 13.87 0.000 0.04 0.10 0.460 -0.75 2.02 0.077 -0.47 -1.75 0.041 
MTGLOAN 1.27 25.14 0.000 -0.43 -1.50 0.067 1.61 18.86 0.000 -0.49 -1.37 0.086 2.02 23.06 0.000 -0.79 -2.09 0.019 
SENSITIVE -0.37 3.48 0.031    -0.33 1.27 0.130    -0.29 0.73 0.196    
STDRET    -0.18 -2.44 0.007    -0.02 -0.30 0.382    0.00 0.10 0.460 
SAVING    -0.01 -0.13 0.447    0.03 0.34 0.368    0.03 0.48 0.316 
LOSS    -0.11 -0.61 0.271    0.09 1.78 0.038    0.05 0.81 0.208 
CAPRATIO    0.01 2.13 0.017    0.01 4.36 0.000    0.03 5.98 0.000 
TRANSACCT    0.31 2.28 0.012    -0.09 -0.58 0.282    -0.20 -1.03 0.152 
COMMLOAN    -0.01 -0.02 0.492    0.00 0.00 0.498    -0.48 -1.19 0.118 
INTANG    2.10 2.23 0.013    0.36 0.35 0.365    0.82 0.63 0.263 
CHGOFF    0.15 1.79 0.037    0.05 1.05 0.147    -0.07 -1.19 0.118 
NONPERFORM    6.48 2.33 0.010    2.28 1.99 0.024    2.32 2.83 0.002 
INEFFICIENCY    1.21 5.41 0.000    0.13 1.62 0.053    0.48 3.73 0.000 
INTDERIV    0.02 2.47 0.007    0.02 2.51 0.006    0.02 3.19 0.001 
EXEMPT    -0.02 -0.46 0.321    -0.03 -0.44 0.330    -0.08 -1.48 0.070 
SECURITIZER    0.10 0.19 0.426    -0.31 -0.70 0.241    -0.22 -0.46 0.323 
                   
Adj. R2** 0.225 0.882 0.181 0.895 0.176 0.916 
N 1,560 1,560 864 864 627 627 
*Max-rescaled R-square is reported for the 1st stage selection model. 
The second stage tests have standard errors clustered on BHCs and control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed because of directional predictions. 
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TABLE 2 
Asset Securitization Risk Measures (N = 2,424) 
Panel A: Distributional Characteristics of the Asset Securitization Risk Variables 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations of the Asset Securitization Risk Variables 
Note: Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. 
Panel C: Weight (Standardized Scoring Coefficients) on the Four Asset Securitization Risk 
Measures in the Component Factor (SECINC excluded due to lack of correlation with 
other variables) 







SECRISK 0.353 0.310 0.377 0.298  55.4% 2.216 
SECINC     N/A   
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Variables Mean Median Min Q1 Q3 Max Std dev 
ABS 0.0219 0 0 0 0 7.6782 0.2006 
RETINT 0.0006 0 0 0 0 0.0957 0.0051 
NPL_SEC 0.0010 0 0 0 0 0.2575 0.0092
CHGOFF_SEC 0.0002 0 -0.0001 0 0 0.0740 0.0025 
SECINC 0.0094 0.000 -75.3404 0 0.0187 7.7991 1.5571 
        
SECRISK 2.53E-16 -0.1739 -0.1767 -0.1739 0 15.1866 0.8144 
        
SECURITIZER 0.6634 1 0 0 1 1 0.4727 
Variables ABS RETINT NPL_SEC CHGOFF_SEC SECINC SECRISK SECURITIZER 
ABS 1.000       
        




      




(<.0001)      




(<.0001) (<.0001)     
SECINC 0.017 -0.010 0.027 -0.070 1.000   
 (0.402) (0.634) (0.183) (0.001)    




(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.689)   
SECURITIZER 0.078 0.086 0.079 0.056 0.004 0.000 1.000 
 (0.000) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.006) (0.832) (1.000)  
TABLE 3 













 Mean Std dev Mean Mean 
T-Stat
. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
N 2,424  1,608 816  426 411 393 330 302 286 276 
Dependent 
Variable 



























LNAF 12.722 1.293 13.000 12.174 
16.92*
** 
12.117 12.564 12.700 12.947 12.988 13.036 13.041 
Test 
Variables 





























































































































































































































































LNTA 21.590 1.618 21.948 20.883 
18.27*
** 
21.255 21.330 21.450 21.786 21.826 21.893 21.883 
BIGN 0.491 0.500 0.592 0.293 
14.88*
** 
0.573 0.533 0.486 0.488 0.454 0.434 0.417 
STDRET 0.322 0.386 0.252 0.459 
-12.37
*** 
0.337 0.361 0.371 0.280 0.264 0.310 0.297 
SAVING 0.054 0.225 0.063 0.036 
3.07**
* 
0.070 0.063 0.064 0.045 0.040 0.038 0.040 
LOSS 0.108 0.311 0.111 0.104 0.49 0.009 0.024 0.018 0.012 0.060 0.315 0.471 
CAPRATIO 13.592 5.063 13.526 13.720 -1.08 14.106 13.871 13.577 13.388 12.675 13.311 13.939 
TRANSACCT 0.570 0.152 0.577 0.557 
2.87**
* 
0.595 0.599 0.579 0.552 0.548 0.517 0.576 
SECURITIES 0.205 0.120 0.203 0.208 -0.94 0.245 0.228 0.207 0.190 0.173 0.173 0.191 
COMMLOAN 0.167 0.102 0.170 0.162 1.77* 0.175 0.167 0.160 0.166 0.169 0.168 0.164 
MTGLOAN 0.296 0.150 0.308 0.272 
5.83**
* 
0.311 0.306 0.303 0.292 0.276 0.281 0.292 
INTANG 0.018 0.023 0.021 0.011 
12.32*
** 
0.013 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.024 0.019 0.016 
CHGOFF 0.336 0.359 0.361 0.285 
4.99**
* 
0.272 0.237 0.211 0.219 0.292 0.522 0.752 
NONPERFOR
M 
0.014 0.023 0.014 0.014 0.84 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.029 0.042 
INEFFICIEN
CY 
0.772 0.154 0.765 0.785 
-2.90*
** 
0.726 0.727 0.738 0.766 0.795 0.850 0.855 
SENSITIVE 0.089 0.225 0.092 0.084 -0.88 0.087 0.137 0.117 0.079 0.072 0.055 0.049 
INTDERIV 0.277 2.355 0.407 0.020 
5.39**
* 
0.258 0.227 0.237 0.301 0.317 0.296 0.347 
SECURITIZE
R 
0.663 0.473 1   0.669 0.652 0.641 0.667 0.666 0.675 0.685 
Note 1: Satterthwaite t test is used. This is an alternative to the pooled-variance t test and is used when the assumption that the 
two populations have unequal variances. It provides a t statistic that symptotically approaches a t distribution, allowing for an 
approximate t test to be calculated.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% based on two-tailed tests. 
Variables are defined in Table 1.
End of Section
TABLE 4 
Pearson Correlations (N = 2,424 Sample Period: 2003–2009) 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Two-tailed p-values: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05; c p < 0.01. The Pearson correlations between the individual asset securitization 
risk variables are presented in Table 2. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 5 
Basic Model Fitting and Validation of Audit Fee Model 
  Pooled Sample: 2003 to 2009 (Dependent Variable: LNAF) 
  (1) Fields et al. (2004) Model (2) Extended Model 
Variable Expected Sign Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value 
INTERCEPT + -1.90 -3.73 0.000 -1.40 -2.48 0.007
LNTA + 0.63 26.94 0.000 0.60 23.30 0.000
BIGN + 0.43 11.63 0.000 0.44 11.93 0.000
STDRET + -0.07 -1.17 0.122 -0.10 -1.75 0.041
SAVING + 0.01 0.13 0.448 0.01 0.15 0.441
LOSS + 0.00 0.03 0.489 0.01 0.25 0.403
CAPRATIO + 0.01 4.40 0.000 0.01 4.26 0.000
TRANSACCT + 0.08 0.64 0.261 0.08 0.72 0.236
SECURITIES + -0.25 -1.53 0.063 -0.19 -1.15 0.124
COMMLOAN + 0.09 0.29 0.387 0.08 0.24 0.406
MTGLOAN + -0.38 -2.40 0.008 -0.40 -2.42 0.008
INTANG + 1.61 1.86 0.032 1.80 2.07 0.019
CHGOFF + 0.10 1.97 0.025 0.10 1.94 0.026
NONPERFORM + 2.98 2.39 0.009 2.92 2.37 0.009
INEFFICIENCY + 0.44 3.68 0.000 0.42 3.54 0.000
SENSITIVE - -0.01 -0.16 0.437 0.00 0.07 0.462 
INTERDIV  - - - 0.02 2.69 0.004
 
 Year Indicators 
Clustered on BHCs 
Year Indicators 
Clustered on BHCs 
N  2,424 2,424 
Adjusted R2  0.883 0.884 
F-Value  227.46; p < .0001 238.49; p < .0001 
Note: Standard errors are clustered on BHCs and models control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed because of 
directional predictions.  
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 6 
Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks 
Model 1 Results (Dependent Variable: LNAF) 
 Pooled 2003–2009 
Before the GFC 
(2003–2006) 







































































0.08 2.14 0.016 0.01 2.69 0.004 1.50 
0.06
7 
GFC    0.40 8.82 
0.00
0 
        
SECRISK*
GFC 







        
SECINC*
GFC 


































































































































































































































































F = 4.01; p < .0001 F = 3.99; p <. 0001       
  
N 2,424 2,424 1,560 864   
Adj. R2 0.885 0.885 0.882 0.895  
F-Stat. 251.07; p < .0001 288.66; p < .0001 233.54; p <. 0001 206.94; p < .0001  
Note: Standard errors are clustered on BHCs and models control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed because of 
directional predictions. Chow Tests indicate any difference in model structure before and after the onset of the GFC with the 
break point as 2007.  
Variables are defined in Table 1.
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TABLE 7 
Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks: Using the Individual Asset Securitization Risk 
Variables, ABS, RETINT, NPL_SEC and CHGOFF_SEC as Test Variables 
 Model 1 Using individual Asset Securitization Risk Variables (Dependent Variable: LNAF)  
 Pooled 2003–2009 Before the GFC (2003–2006) 








































0.17 0.433 0.50 0.308 
GFC    0.39 8.81 
<0.00
1 
        
ABS*GFC    
-0.3
3 
-1.61 0.054         
Adj. R2 0.885 0.885 0.881 0.895   
F-Stat. 228.92; p < .0001 229.65; p < .0001 224.38; p < .0001 172.33; p < .0001   
Panel B: 
RETINT 














GFC    0.39 8.58 
<0.00
1 
        
RETINT*GFC    
-2.0
2 
-1.02 0.155         
Adj. R2 0.885 0.885 0.881 0.895   
F-Stat. 339.58; p < .0001 449.88; p < .0001 261.87; p < .0001 386.55; p < .0001   
Panel C: 
NPL_SEC 

















0.90 0.185 0.71 0.239 
GFC    0.39 8.90 
<0.00
1 
        
NPL_SEC*GFC    
-4.3
9 
-1.77 0.039         
Adj. R2 0.885 0.885 0.882 0.895   
F-Stat. 255.14; p < .0001 233.73; p < .0001 231.00; p < .0001 179.87; p < .0001   
Panel D: 
CHGOFF_SEC 










0.75 0.225 -0.05 0.482 
GFC    0.38 8.65 
<0.00
1 
        
CHGOFF_SEC*
GFC 
   
-4.8
6 
-0.65 0.257         
Adj. R2 0.885 0.885 0.881 0.895   
F-Stat. 278.07; p < .0001 259.46; p < .0001 315.36; p < .001 175.57: p < .0001   
               
N 2,424 2,424 1,560 864   
Note: Standard errors are clustered on BHCs and models control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed because of 
directional predictions. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 8 
Heckman Two-Stage Approach: Controlling for Self-Selection of Securitization Activities 
Panel A: Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks 





2nd Stage Estimates (Securitizer 
Subsample) 
(Dependent Variable: LNAF) 
2nd Stage Estimates (Both 
Securitizers and Non-Securitizers) 





























































































































































































































































































            























































































































































































































































































      
Adj. R2* 0.190 0.895 0.895 0.887 0.887 
N 2,424 1,608 1,608 2,424 2,424 
*Max-rescaled R-square is reported for the 1st stage selection model.  
The second stage tests are clustered on BHCs with year effect controlled.  




TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel B: Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks for the Before the GFC and During 
the GFC Subsamples 
 Before the GFC (2003–2006) During the GFC (2
 
1st Stage Selection 
(Dependent Variable: 
SECURITIZER) 





2nd Stage Estimates 












 Coef Chi-Sq  p-value Coef T-Stat p-value Coef T-Stat p-value Coef Chi-Sq p-value Coef T-Stat 
INTERCEPT -8.08 131.17 0.000 -1.97 -1.78 0.038 -2.61 -3.96 0.000 -6.22 37.78 < .0001 -3.57 -2.09
SECRISK    0.03 2.67 0.004 0.03 2.10 0.018    0.02 0.73
SECINC    0.08 2.29 0.012 0.07 2.13 0.017    0.00 2.68
IMR    0.17 0.56 0.287 0.49 2.28 0.011    0.93 1.85
LNTA 0.39 131.32 0.000 0.61 14.36 0.000 0.65 18.53 0.000 0.29 37.39 < .0001 0.71 11.31
MTGLOAN 1.18 23.66 0.000 -0.24 -1.13 0.130 -0.09 -0.51 0.305 1.37 15.03 0.000 -0.05 -0.14
CHGOFF 0.52 10.55 0.001 0.14 0.95 0.172 0.28 2.63 0.004 0.15 1.94 0.082 0.10 1.37
INTDERIV 0.57 1.41 0.118 0.02 0.247 0.007 0.01 1.94 0.027 0.80 1.46 0.114 0.01 1.77
LIQUIDITY -0.19 10.35 0.001       -0.10 1.20 0.136   
BIGN    0.45 9.22 0.000 0.47 11.73 0.000    0.41 7.71
STDRET    -0.22 -2.62 0.005 -0.29 -4.36 0.000    -0.08 -0.93
SAVING    -0.01 -0.09 0.464 -0.01 -0.23 0.408    -0.06 -0.64
LOSS    -0.23 -0.92 0.179 -0.10 -0.57 0.286    0.12 2.05
CAPRATIO    0.01 1.82 0.035 0.01 1.95 0.026    0.02 5.10
TRANSACCT    0.29 1.96 0.026 0.27 2.15 0.016    -0.10 -0.54
SECURITIES    -0.31 -1.37 0.085 -0.23 -1.36 0.087    0.25 0.89
COMMLOAN    -0.13 -0.44 0.330 0.06 0.20 0.420    -0.38 -1.28
INTANG    2.10 2.16 0.016 2.29 2.44 0.008    0.67 0.66
NONPERFOR
M    7.06 1.76 0.040 6.61 2.34 0.010    3.50 2.99 
INEFFICIENC
Y    0.91 3.24 0.001 1.16 5.47 0.000    0.07 0.76 
SENSITIVE     0.02 0.42 0.338 0.00 0.02 0.491    0.02 0.17
SECURITIZER       -0.80 -2.24 0.013      
               
Adj. R2** 0.221 0.888 0.883 0.153 0.910
N 1,560 1,025 1,560 864 583
*Max-rescaled R-square is reported for the 1st stage selection model. 
The second stage tests have standard errors clustered on BHCs and control for year fixed effects. All p values are one-tailed 
because of directional predictions. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
